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Institutional features of the African setting—large 
extended families and imperfect credit and land 
markets—matter to the equity and efficiency roles played 
by intergenerational linkages. Using original survey data 
on Senegal that include an individualized measure of 
consumption, this paper studies the role played by land 
inheritance, other bequests and parental background as 
influences on an adult’s economic welfare and economic 
activities. Although intergenerational linkages are evident, 
the analysis finds a seemingly high degree of mobility 
across generations, associated with the shift from farm 
to non-farm sectors and the greater economic activity of 
women. Male-dominated bequests of land and housing 
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the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mravallion@worldbank.org and dvandewalle@
worldbank.org.  
bring little gain to mean consumption and play little 
role in explaining inequality, although they have effects 
on the sector of activity. Inheritance of non-land assets 
and the education and occupation of parents (especially 
the mother) and their choices about children’s schooling 
are more important to adult welfare than property 
inheritance. Significant gender inequality in consumption 
is evident, although it is almost entirely explicable 
in terms of factors such as education and (non-land) 
inheritance. There are a number of other pronounced 
gender differences, with intergenerational linkages 
coming through the mother rather than the father. 
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1.   Introduction 
The re-allocation of productive assets to more efficient uses is an important means of 
promoting higher aggregate output in any economy. The most important (non-labor) asset in 
most poor countries is land. The economic, social and political means by which a country 
allocates its land can thus have bearing on aggregate economic efficiency.  
Much of the literature has argued that well-defined individual land rights are crucial for 
efficiency, though there have been dissenting views.
2 The main means of changing land 
ownership rights studied in the literature are market purchases and administrative land re-
allocations, both of which have been studied extensively.
3 Yet, in many developing-country 
settings it may well be the case that land inheritance is a more common means of re-assigning 
land-use rights, although this has received very little attention. With imperfect credit markets, 
inheritance may have bearing on the efficiency of farming and also promote new non-farm 
economic activity by providing the kind of lumpy boost to individual wealth that can allow new 
investment opportunities to be pursued—opportunities that would otherwise be impossible to 
take up given borrowing constraints. Thus there is interest in better understanding inheritance.   
Equity is another reason we want to know more about inheritance. It is now understood 
that many poor developing countries are characterized by relatively high inequality (World 
Bank, 2005; Ferreira and Ravallion, 2009). However, we know far less about how much of that 
inequality is transmitted across generations. This can create inequalities of opportunity that come 
with costs to efficiency and growth, as argued in World Bank (2005). Are these economies 
characterized by a high degree of inter-generational persistence of poverty and affluence, or is 
there churning associated with successes and failures for adults taking up new economic 
opportunities?  How much do family circumstances matter to adult outcomes? While there has 
been much debate about these issues in developed countries, they have received relatively little 
attention in poor, primarily agrarian, economies. Inheritance of agricultural land—the main non-
labor factor of production—is the first mechanism one thinks of for the inter-generational 
transmission of inequality in such settings.  
                                                           
2   For a dissenting view on the importance of individual land rights per se see Platteau (1996). More 
supportive views can be found in, for example, Feder and Noronha (1987) and Deininger (2003). Also see the 
discussions in Barrows, and Roth (1990), Besley (1995) and Jacoby and Minten (2007). 
3   See, for example, Deininger (2003) and Ravallion and van de Walle (2008). 3 
 
The role of gender is also of interest in this context. We know very little about inter-
personal inequality in living standards, including between men and women, given that survey 
data on consumption are almost invariably collected at the household level. Since adult women 
are generally married, it is difficult to separate their own welfare from that of their husbands on 
the basis of household data. However, gender dimensions of inequality are considered important. 
Male control over land and its inheritance has long been a prominent gender issue in 
development studies.
4 Maternal education and work experience might also be expected to play a 
role. It has often been argued that maternal education has an important influence on children‘s 
health, nutritional status and schooling.
5 There might also be implications for adult welfare and 
economic activity, though there has been less research on this intergenerational linkage.    
In an effort to yield some new knowledge on these issues, this paper takes advantage of 
an unusual dataset that measures consumption at a relatively disaggregated level within the 
household, so that we can build an ―individualized‖ consumption-based welfare measure. This 
allows us to distinguish inheritance and its economic welfare impacts by gender. The data were 
collected in Senegal—one of many developing countries where these issues have salience.   
We document new evidence on the extent of inequality in living standards and its origins, 
paying special attention to the role of inheritance. Our results lead us to question the traditional 
model of a developing economy with imperfect credit markets in which privately-owned land is 
a marketable asset generating an income stream exclusively for the designated individual owner. 
But our results are easier to understand in the light of richer models of underdeveloped rural 
economies. We already know from the literature (in anthropology as well as economics) that 
market failures and non-market allocation processes play an important role in how land is used. 
As anthropologists have emphasized, agricultural land inheritance in much of Africa is typically 
filtered through customary land allocation processes involving kinship or community groups.
6 
Inheritance signals a change in responsibility, such that the recipient of inherited land inherits 
obligations as well as an asset, and it is an asset that is not easily monetized to support other 
productive investments.  
                                                           
4   In the context of land rights in Africa see Gray and Kevane (1999) for an overview of the issues.   
5   See, for example, Haveman and Wolfe (1995), and Hill and King (1995). The causal interpretation of these 
correlations can be questioned given the possibility of inter-generationally correlated latent factors; see Behrman 
and Rosenzweig (2002). Dumas and Lambert (2011) find that maternal education plays a weaker role once properly 
instrumented. 
6   For a useful overview of these issues see Shipton and Goheen (1992). Also see the discussion in Platteau 
(2000). 4 
 
The impacts of inheritance will naturally reflect how the ―dynastic family‖ allocates its 
resources, given the market and institutional environment. In principle at least, the extended 
family has the ability to attain any desired distribution of consumption, independently of the 
formal assignment of ownership rights. Indeed, it is an open question in this setting whether 
there is any net impact on the inheritor of a land bequest within the family.   
Our results suggest that other mechanisms for the inter-generational transmission of 
inequality—notably related to parental education and children‘s schooling—are in fact more 
important than land inheritance in explaining interpersonal economic welfare and economic 
activities. Even in very poor settings, parental background can influence the schooling, 
expectations and life chances generally of children in ways that matter to the realized living 
standards of adults. There is evidence consistent with this view in the literature. Estudillo et al. 
(2001) emphasize the combination of both land inheritance and schooling in the inter-
generational transmission of wealth in the rural Philippines. Lesorogol et al. (2011) find that the 
current wealth of Kenyan pastoralists is correlated with parental wealth and formal education but 
not with livestock inheritance.  Ferreira and Gignoux (2010) find that family background 
characteristics are an important source of unequal opportunities in Latin America. Dumas and 
Lambert (2011) find that parental education has a strong effect on child schooling in Senegal. 
Some degree of intergenerational correlation in occupational choices can be expected, for which 
we find supportive evidence, though with a (possibly surprising) degree of mobility.  
We begin in the following section by discussing the multiple roles of land ownership in 
this setting. After that we describe our data for Senegal and the methods of analysis, followed by 
our empirical results.  
2.  Land inheritance in an underdeveloped rural economy 
  Land ownership has long played a role in policy making and thinking about economic 
development. Taxes and transfers are often conditioned on the amount of land owned. Famously, 
the American political economist of the late 19th century Henry George advocated taxes on the 
value of land, and (of course) these were to be levied on the designated owner. Taxes on land are 
found in almost all countries. Also, transfers and various direct interventions are often targeted 
according to land holding, defined by ownership. These include policies aiming to redistribute 
land itself. Tenure security is traditionally defined in terms of individual titles of private 
ownership. There have been many efforts (often supported by external development assistance) 
to foster individual ownership through land titling, with expected benefits to the government in 5 
 
efforts to tax land value, and also expected gains in both efficiency (promoting land investment 
through greater tenure security and access to credit) and equity (notably in promoting women's 
empowerment).
7   
The economic model underlying all these policies essentially views private ownership of 
land (with or without a formal title) as a form of private wealth, which is expected to deliver 
exclusively to its owner an income stream derived from the productive capacity of the owned 
land.  In the context of a mainly rural market-based economy, one thus expects land ownership to 
play an important role in determining the individual‘s standard of living. Land inheritance is one 
way of acquiring ownership. Thus land inheritance should be important to the inter-generational 
transmission of inequality and also to economic activity, including diversification into non-farm 
production, especially when credit is unavailable. Development policy debates have sometimes 
focused on inheritance laws, especially reforms aiming to improve women‘s rights.
8 
However, it is far from clear how relevant this standard model of land as marketable and 
productive wealth is to underdeveloped and poor rural economies where land markets are thin or 
non-existent and imperfect (and asymmetric) information and long-established social institutions 
play an important role in how land is allocated and used. The benefits from efforts to foster 
individual ownership titles are known to be uncertain when individual titling is introduced in an 
indigenous system of tenure, which is probably why the evidence that such efforts have had their 
expected benefits appears to be mixed.
9 
Inheritance of the family farm may well bring enhanced individual power within the 
family—interpretable as a non-pecuniary gain—but it undoubtedly also comes with 
responsibilities. Past observations about African agriculture lead one to question the extent of the 
gains to the inheritor of land, who may have to take on various obligations. These naturally 
include responsibility for the family as an economic unit, but they may also extend well beyond 
the family. Anthropologists have emphasized the social responsibilities that come with acquired 
wealth such as through land ownership, notably in Africa.
10 As Shipton and Goheen (1992, 
p.311) note with reference to land in rural Africa, ―Rights often entail duties. .. Cultivation and 
grazing rights may entail obligations to share farm products beyond the domestic group.‖  
                                                           
7   On the expected land productivity gains from titling see Feder and Noronha (1987), Barrows, and Roth 
(1990), Besley (1995) and Deininger (2003). 
8   Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2011), Deininger et al. (2010) and Roy (2011) find evidence that legal 
reforms related to property rights have brought gains to women (the first in Ethiopia and the other two in India).  
9   Deininger (2003) reviews the evidence. A recent example of a study pointing to success of land titling in 
raising productivity is Holden et al. (2009); an example finding little or no impact is Jacoby and Minten (2007). 
10   Though not only Africa; see Ravallion and Dearden (1988), using data for rural Java. 6 
 
Similarly, with reference to the Luo people of Kenya, Shipton (1992, p. 361) argues that ―Rights 
of individuals [over land] were not thought sacrosanct, but instead they interlocked with the 
rights of others, and overlapped with those of families and wider groups.‖ Individual 
responsibilities within a village economy are often embedded in broader social ties, interpretable 
as means of enforcing cooperative equilibria that bring collective benefits (Platteau, 2000). 
Whether such responsibilities come with a consumption incentive is unclear on a priori grounds, 
given that there are also likely to be non-pecuniary benefits and costs.  
The local state and community governance are often involved in land allocation, as are 
traditional non-market allocation processes. In particular, land that is not kept in use and looked 
after appropriately risks appropriation by the community in many rural economies: the household 
head is thus in charge of  making sure this doesn‘t happen so as to insure the family‘s long-term 
security.  Further, membership of a (potentially large) extended family often conveys rights to 
work the family‘s land holding and/or share in its bounty. These arrangements can mean that 
individual land ownership conveys obligations and associated costs to the owner, especially if he 
or she is also the head of household. One cannot even rule out consumption losses to the 
inheritor. Without a land market it will be hard for the recipient to ―cash in‖ the land to finance 
some other (non-farm) investment. The lack of a land market may then create occupational 
stickiness, whereby the bequest of land inhibits the recipient‘s transition to non-farm activities 
(though possibly enhancing the scope for such a transition by others in the family).  Land-market 
failures may even entail that the (say) eldest son who gets the land and the responsibilities of 
being the head of household ends up trapped in farming, while his siblings see new opportunities 
for diversification into non-farm activities.  
Indeed, inheriting the land but without the responsibilities of headship may allow the 
recipient to leave the land to take up some non-farm activity. Given weak market and 
governmental institutions for risk-sharing, the family farm is known to serve a social security 
role in traditional societies.  The recipient of the land bequest may then effectively transfer the 
right to other family members (the mother, spouse, and children). Their security (at some 
minimal level) is thus assured, and the son is free to seek work or start an enterprise elsewhere, 
such as in an urban area. However, one can also imagine situations in which non-market factors 
in the allocation of command over the product of land can discourage agriculture, even for the 
household head, in favor of other (non-farm) activities possibly outside the village economy, 
such as in urban areas. This can happen when the non-market allocation rules entail a sharing of 
the product of land, and that the sharing rule entails that inheriting extra land reduces the 7 
 
marginal product of the owner‘s effort in farming relative to other uses of labor time, thus 
generating a substitution toward non-farm activities. This is a distortion to intersectoral 
allocation, in the sense that marginal products of labor become unequal between activities. In 
principle, such an inefficiency could be avoided if the family is well informed about other (non-
farm) income sources, so allowing sharing rules based on total income.  
Finally, it is worth underlining that land inheritance can be accompanied by learning 
within kinship groups, a source of specific human capital that may play an important role in the 
welfare gains from inheritance. It is widely believed that traditional farming practices in 
developing countries are characterized by a high degree of farm-specific knowledge, 
accumulated through experience farming the same land. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) have 
emphasized the role of family-specific information in explaining inter-generational and intra-
household land transfers, including inheritance; they find support for the claim that specific-
knowledge about the family farm entails that land is kept within the family rather than being 
sold. This could also explain why land markets are often thin or non-existent and also why the 
extended family is so common in underdeveloped rural economies, given that the older 
generation will have accumulated greater knowledge about the family farm. As long as the 
extended family can share knowledge there will be little economic loss at the death of the head 
of the household, though one can imagine circumstances (including unanticipated deaths) when 
that is not the case.  
The upshot of these observations is that inheritance can have ambiguous effects on 
welfare and economic activities. The rest of this paper will address these issues empirically using 
an unusual data set for Senegal. 
3.  Setting and data 
More than half of Senegal‘s population is rural—57% out of a population of about 12.5 
million inhabitants in 2009—although the contribution of agriculture to GDP amounts to only 
18%.
11  Like other African countries, Senegal has seen considerable population urbanization; at 
the time of independence in 1960 rural areas were the home of 77% of the population.  
                                                           
11   This is less than for its neighboring countries where the share of the rural population is typically about two 
thirds (apart for Mauritania which, due to deserts over a large area, has only a third of its population in rural areas) 
and the share of agriculture in GDP hardly ever below 25%, reaching a third in Mali and even 60% in Guinea-
Bissau.  8 
 
On paper, agricultural land is allocated through local administrative processes in Senegal. 
Since 1964, most of the land (between 95 and 98%) has been part of what is called the national 
domain. Land use rights are attributed by local land committees on the basis of needs and 
capacity to farm. This land cannot be sold and in theory cannot be bequeathed either 
(Caveriviére, 1986).   
However, the reality on the ground is clearly rather different. Bequests are common, 
including land inheritance. The survey data we use indicate that 31% of men, but only 17% of 
women, report that they inherited land. (If one confines the sample to those whose father has 
died, the proportions are 43% for men and 28% for women.)  Looking at all forms of inheritance 
(including housing, durables, money and productive assets) 54% of men in the sample inherited 
something, while 38% of women did. In practice, heirs are given priority to obtain the use rights 
over any other potential users. Hence, inheritance of paternal lineage land is an important means 
of access to ownership.  
Until the constitution of 2001, women were not allowed to own land in Senegal. 
Furthermore, until May 2010, they were not allowed to be part of the land committees in charge 
of the attribution of use rights. Hence, women very rarely received land through this allocation 
mechanism. On the intergenerational transmission side, several inheritance laws coexist in 
Senegal that give very different treatment to women.  Each individual can choose before his 
death which law he wants to abide by.  The French inspired system of inheritance dictates that 
wealth be shared equally among children, whatever their gender. By contrast, the Islamic 
inheritance law (which is the most common choice in practice) limits the inheritance of 
daughters to half of that of sons.
12  In addition, entrenched tradition favors sons for inheriting 
land. Daughters are supposedly compensated by their brothers with money or other forms of 
wealth, for what would have otherwise been their share of land inheritance. The data (described 
in more detail below) reveal that very few women (about 4%) have any land to transfer to their 
heirs when they die, while more than a third of the men leave some land. In the sample, we 
observe very few changes in land ownership over the five years preceding the survey. 
Nevertheless, half of the cases where the amount of land owned increased are due to inheritance.  
In these respects, Senegal is not unusual within Sub-Saharan Africa (Cooper, 2008, 
2010). The rights of women to land are mainly indirect (Platteau et al. 2000). As a daughter 
                                                           
12   Although some of the ethnic groups in Senegal are of matrilineal tradition, those traditions have mostly 
been displaced by Islam when it comes to inheritance. As a result, inheritance from adult male other than the father 
(such as a maternal uncle or foster parent for example) remains a rare occurrence. 9 
 
living in her father‘s household, a woman will work on the family land and eventually obtain use 
rights on a plot. As a wife, she‘ll work on the land of her husband‘s family and might also have 
use rights on a particular plot. If she is in neither of these positions, she simply won‘t have access 
to land. This in part explains the high remarriage rate following widowhood or divorce.  Whether 
this fact contributes to gender inequality in terms of well-being is a question we want to explore 
in this paper.  
The data used here come from an original survey entitled Pauvreté et Structure Familiale 
(Poverty and Family Structure, henceforth PSF) conducted in Senegal in 2006/2007. The PSF 
survey stems from the cooperation between a team of French researchers and the National 
Statistical Agency of Senegal.
13  The survey is described in detail in De Vreyer et al. (2008). 
The PSF is a nationally representative survey covering a sample of over 1800 households 
spread over 150 clusters drawn randomly from the census districts so as to insure a 
geographically representative sample.  About 1,750 household records can be exploited, covering 
14,450 individuals. The survey describes a population of which the majority (57.1%) live in rural 
areas, 48% is male and 95% is Muslim—statistics that accord well with other sources (World 
Bank, 2009). Urbanization over time is evident in that, amongst those adults who had a father in 
rural areas, 22% now live in urban areas. A similar percentage of those whose mother lived in 
rural areas also do so.   
Senegalese households are large, with slightly more than eight members on average in the 
PSF. The families are typically multigenerational. Polygamous unions are common, with 24% of 
married men and 37% of married women engaged in such unions, which mostly comprise a 
husband and two wives (only 20% of polygamous unions have more than two wives). We find 
that 31% of polygamous men have non-cohabiting wives. Among those, in only half of the cases 
are the two parts headed by the same person or by the husband for one and a wife for the other 
i.e., for the other half, a married polygamous women is living in a household headed by a relative 
(mainly her father, brother or son). Those large households are extended both horizontally and 
vertically, with 36% of household members that are neither the head, nor one of his wives or 
children. Two thirds of households include such "extended" family members. 
                                                           
13   Momar Sylla and Matar Gueye of the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie of Senegal 
(ANSD) on the one hand and Philippe De Vreyer (University of Paris-Dauphine and IRD-DIAL) Sylvie Lambert 
(PSE) and Abla Safir (now with the World Bank) designed the survey. The data collection was conducted by the 
ANSD thanks to the funding of the IDRC (International Development Research Center), INRA Paris and 
CEPREMAP. 10 
 
In addition to the usual information on individual characteristics, the survey collected 
details on each household‘s structure and budgetary arrangements. Each household was divided 
into ―cells‖ according to the following rule: the head of household and unaccompanied 
dependent members, such as his widowed parent or his children whose mothers do not live in the 
same household, are grouped together. Then, each wife of the head and her children make up a 
separate group. Finally, any other family nucleus, such as a married child of the household head 
with his/her spouse and children, forms a separate group. This disaggregation emerged from field 
interviews as being the relevant way to split the household into its component groups.  It is worth 
noting that enumerators saw this as a fairly natural way to divide households and had no 
difficulty organizing the household in this way and collecting the data accordingly. 
Consumption expenditures are recorded in several parts: first all common expenditures 
are collected (housing, electricity bills etc). Regarding food expenditures, a detailed account is 
made of who shares which meal and how much money is specifically used to prepare this meal 
(the ―DQ‖, i.e. ―dépenses quotidiennes,‖ which is the name the Senegalese give to the amount of 
money a woman has at her disposal to buy fresh ingredients for the meals of the day).  Then 
individual consumption is collected at the group level (such as clothing, mobile phone, 
transportation, food outside the home). Finally, expenditures that are shared between several 
groups but not the whole household are collected.  
Hence, a measure of per capita consumption can be constructed at the group (―cell‖) level 
and this allows us to identify unequal consumption levels within households.  Subgroups also 
emerge that take some or all of their meals separately (in 17% of households), thus widening the 
possibility for differences in nutritional intake among household members.  
When looking at total expenditures, inequalities within the household are evident: the 
ratio between the expenditures of the richest and the poorest group within a household can be as 
high as 18 and is still equal to 4.4 after trimming off the 5% most unequal households. 
Computing an inequality index for the distribution of cash expenditures in the population, we 
find a Gini index of 59.8% if we attribute to each person the average per capita consumption 
level in his or her household. The index is 62.7% if instead each individual is attributed the per 
capita consumption in his cell (i.e. the sum of the per capita expenditures specific to the cell and 
of the cell‘s share of common household expenditures, distributed on a per capita basis within 
the cell). The Gini index of inequality in the distribution of the cell-specific component of cash 
expenditures (ignoring the joint consumption within the household) is 77.9%. 11 
 
Thanks to these data we can construct a relatively individualized measure of 
consumption, which is almost never available in household surveys.  This is what we will use to 
assess individual economic welfare. The measure we use here is the amount of expenditures 
specific to the cell and not shared with any other cell plus the cell‘s imputed share of the 
household‘s joint expenditures.  We will restrict our study to individuals who are heads of their 
cells. They are all adults with at least one dependent, and for consumption purposes, they are 
assumed to be the decision makers at the cell level.  We are therefore left with 4401 
observations, of which 56.8% are women. The average number of cells per household is 2.51. 
The range is from 1 to 12; 81% of the sampled households have more than one cell.  
Importantly for the purpose of our paper, these data include information on parental 
characteristics and inheritance. If the parent has died, the survey asked whether he or she left any 
inheritance and then, for each person, whether they obtained any inheritance in the form of land, 
housing, money, durables or productive capital. No valuation of these inheritances was obtained. 
In particular, we do not know how much land was inherited, although the endogeneity concerns 
(which we return to) would clearly be even greater using amounts of inherited land rather than 
simply the incidence of inheritance.  
4.  Results 
We begin by describing inheritance patterns in our data, after which we study the 
associations with living standards, economic activity and mobility. (Appendix 1 gives summary 
statistics on the main variables used from the PSF.) 
Inheritance patterns 
As can be seen in Table 1, many more fathers have any inheritance to leave to their heirs 
than do mothers. 72% of deceased fathers left land bequests, but only 22% of deceased mothers 
did so. Fathers bequeath their wealth to their sons more often than to their daughters, particularly 
when it is in the form of land. Mothers treated sons and daughters roughly equally in this respect. 
With regard to parental characteristics, information was collected on the occupation and 
education of each parent for each individual. The last place of the mother and father‘s residence 
is also known (allowing us to know in particular whether an individual resides in the same 
village as his parents).     12 
 
Occupation has been classified under three headings: agriculture, non agriculture or 
inactive. Table 2 gives the joint distribution of occupations of parents and their children for men 
and women. The table also gives Cramer‘s V; in all four cases the correlation is significant at the 
1% level.
14 
We find that 36% of individuals had a father working in agriculture, while 22% declare 
that their mother was in agriculture. Note that ―housewives‖ are coded as inactive.  It is likely 
that mothers were declared housewives even when they did some agricultural work so that those 
who report being in agriculture probably really dedicated most of their time to this occupation, 
suggesting relatively poor households.  
Women have been moving out of engaging solely in household work.  We find that 48% 
of sampled women were coded as ―inactive‖ but that this was true of 61% of their mothers. One 
third of those with inactive mothers went into the non-farm sector, with far fewer going into 
farming.  
In fact Table 2 suggests considerable mobility out of farming across generations. Only 
one third of the one third of men whose father worked in agriculture stayed in the sector, though 
there is stronger persistence with respect to mother‘s sector with 43% of the men (―only‖ 33% of 
the women) who declared that their mother was working in agriculture doing so as well. 
Participation in the non-farm sector was more persistent across generations, with nearly three-
quarters of those men whose father worked in the non-farm sector being also recorded as 
working in that sector. 
To further explore the characteristics of those who inherit, Table 3 gives probits for any 
form of inheritance, while Table 4 gives probits for land in particular; in both cases these are 
marginal effects. In each case we also give the breakdown by gender. We give results for two 
specifications, the second of which drops a number of variables that might be considered 
endogenous to inheritance. (Later we will use these pruned regressions as the first stage for an 
instrumental variables estimator.) While the causal interpretation of the first regression 
(including the endogenous variables) can be questioned, it is still of descriptive interest.  
We include a wide range of controls in these regressions (and those reported later), 
including the following individual characteristics: gender, age and age squared, age at first 
                                                           
14   Cramer‘s V is a measure of correlation for contingency tables. It lies between 0 and 1 (perfect correlation). 
The corresponding Chi-square statistic is 2nV
2 (for our 3x3 table). 13 
 
marriage, a dummy for whether one is the first born of a given gender among siblings with the 
same mother and same father, a dummy for whether one is the first born among all children with 
the same mother and father, a dummy for whether the first born sibling from the same mother 
and father is a boy, number of brothers from the same father and mother, number of brothers 
from the same father only and same mother only, and the same three variables for sisters, 
dummies for ethnic group, a dummy for being Muslim relative to other religions, having some 
formal education, whether fostered as a child, and whether fostered at a young age (prior to two 
years of age, which typically implies a permanent move for the child in the Senegal context).  
There are also controls for parental characteristics (education, occupation, place of residence, 
whether the father died in the last two years, and whether the mother did so) and some 
demographic variables describing the household (log household size) and the individual‘s cell 
(log cell size, share of adults and share of children age 5 and under).  In all cases our education 
variable is defined as a dummy for whether the individual has some formal education.  
We continue to find that men are more likely to inherit than women, even with the 
controls. Being male adds 0.11 to the conditional probability of receiving any inheritance, while 
it adds 0.07 to the probability of inheriting land.    
Unsurprisingly, the death of either parent increases the probability of inheritance, and the 
coefficients are considerably higher for paternal death. In the full sample, death of the father 
alone adds 0.67 to the probability of inheritance, while death of the mother adds only 0.15. This 
is probably due to the fact that at the death of a woman, her land is first passed onto her husband 
and transferred to children only at his death. By contrast, children inherit from their father at his 
death, whether or not their mother is still alive. These effects are significant across almost all 
strata and specifications, the only exception being that death of the mother is not a significant 
predictor of land inheritance by women.  The effect of a father‘s recent death dampens the large 
―father dead‖ effect (bringing it down from 0.67 to 0.57, when the mother is still alive), 
suggesting that inheritance is delayed somewhat.     
There is a positive coefficient on education in the regressions for any inheritance, which 
casts doubt on the idea of substitution by parents between formal schooling and inheritance 
(whereby some children get some form of inheritance while others get formal schooling). 
However, there is some sign of such substitution for land inheritance, though it is only 
statistically significant for women; those women with formal schooling are less likely to inherit 
land. Obviously, this might reflect the individual choice of an educated woman with a non-farm 14 
 
economic activity to give up her land inheritance to the benefit of her siblings, rather than a 
parental decision to substitute one form of transmission for another. 
Men who were fostered as boys are more likely to inherit land unless they were fostered 
before age two. This pattern is plausible. Fostering out a very young child is suggestive of giving 
away the child (for example to a childless parent), which is an indication that inheritance is 
unlikely. By contrast, fostering an older child is in general less permanent and more suggestive 
of an investment in the child, which would also suggest that inheritance is more likely.  None of 
these effects are statistically significant for girls. 
Having a mother active in the non-farm sector significantly increases the probability of 
any inheritance for men although not for women.  For land inheritance, it is father‘s non-farm 
activity that matters but negatively ─ significantly reducing the likelihood of inheriting land for 
both genders. Paternal activity in farm work has no effect on inheritance but maternal farm work 
has a positive correlation with men‘s, and less so women‘s, land inheritance.  
Finally, the number of siblings of the opposite gender is significantly associated with 
inheriting from one‘s parents.  For men a positive effect on land and on any inheritance, is 
related to the number of sisters from the same father or same parents;
15 for women, the number 
of brothers from the same mother reduces the likelihood of getting any inheritance while more 
brothers from the same father has a significant but small positive influence on land inheritance.   
Controlling for these other variables, there is little sign that the probability of inheritance 
is different between urban and rural areas for men.  However, women‘s probability of any 
inheritance is lower in rural areas. 
Effects of inheritance on consumption, economic activities and mobility 
We regress the log of cell-specific consumption expenditure per person on dummy 
variables for having inherited land, housing and other assets (finance, consumer durables and 
physical capital) including a large number of control variables, to account for the heterogeneity 
in individual and household characteristics, including parental characteristics, as described 
above. Other dependent variables we study include farm and non-farm activity and mobility 
(whether the respondent lives where his/her parents had lived). We follow past literature in 
assuming the exogeneity of inheritance (and other aforementioned controls); indeed, inheritance 
                                                           
15   ―Sibling from same parents‖ means that the siblings share both parents. By contrast, ―sibling from the same 
father‖ means that the father is common, but not the mother (and conversely for ―sibling from the same mother‖). 15 
 
has been used as an instrumental variable for current wealth and land rights in explaining various 
dimensions of current living standards and land productivity.
16 However, the assumption can be 
questioned (as we discuss later) and so we also test robustness to relaxing the exogeneity 
assumption, under assumed exclusion restrictions related to the family of birth. 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 give results for (log) cell expenditure per person; recall that this 
combines the cell-specific expenditures with imputed values for the cell‘s share of jointly 
consumed items within the household. Table 5 first presents the coefficients on inheritance 
estimated without any controls, followed by those estimated by adding various correlates, which 
we do in two steps: adding controls for geographic effects alone, and then adding the controls for 
individual, household and parental characteristics.   We next give results with all controls for the 
full sample, and for both an urban-rural stratification and gender stratification in Table 6 and 7.  
Without any controls, inheriting land has a strong negative correlation with consumption 
(Table 5). But this largely vanishes when one controls for location, reflecting the fact that rural 
households tend to be both poorer and more likely to inherit land. Similarly, inheriting a house is 
strongly positively correlated with consumption without controlling for location or and other 
individual and household characteristics, but this vanishes when the controls are added. 
However, a positive effect of other (non-land, non-housing) forms of inheritance emerges with 
the controls.  
This finding of no statistically significant effects of land or housing inheritance in the full 
sample is also evident in the various strata (urban/rural, male/female) (Table 6).  The significant 
effects of other types of inheritance in the full sample are confined to the rural stratum and to 
men.  
We find that the gender gap in consumption largely vanishes when we add our controls. 
Adult male heads of cells (typically, though not always, the overall household head as well) have 
higher consumption than females ceteris paribus, but the difference is modest at a gain in log 
consumption of 0.01, and it is not statistically significant (Table 6). Note, however, that our 
controls include variables such as schooling, which are unequal between genders. The simple 
regression coefficient (the difference in mean log consumption) is 0.57 and is significant at the 
1% level (t=14.92). So our finding can be interpreted as indicating that the gender gap in 
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consumption can be explained by the gender difference in individual and household 
characteristics.   
Along with the gender differences in characteristics, which (as we have seen) account for 
the gender disparity in consumption, there are also gender differences in returns to 
characteristics.  A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients across the 
regressions for men and women (F( 72,  1498) = 1.84, Prob > F = 0.0000). 
Own education is significant in the consumption regressions, as expected. Strikingly, 
maternal education has a much stronger effect—an impact on log consumption of 0.27—than 
paternal education, and this is due to its effect in urban areas and for women. Having a father 
(but not a mother) who worked in the non-farm sector has a large and significant effect on log 
consumption of 0.30; having a father in farming has a smaller effect (0.17). (The left out 
category is inactive.)  These effects are stronger for men than for women. It is clear that parental 
characteristics matter, even though land and housing inheritance do not. 
Being fostered out as a child is associated with higher adult consumption; the effect is 
confined to men, and is stronger for those living in urban areas.  This result is consistent with the 
fact that the practice of fostering (which is common in Senegal) is often associated with 
investment in the human capital of the child. Notice, however, that having been fostered out 
young has an offsetting effect for men.  
When we stratify by the interaction of gender with urban-rural residence, a sharper 
picture emerges on the adult consumption gains from other forms of inheritance, namely that 
they are confined to rural men (Table 7).  
Table 8 summarizes the key marginal effects from probits for agricultural self-
employment.  Parental characteristics matter, though in some possibly surprising ways. Having a 
father in farming does not have any significant effect but a mother who was a farmer makes it 
more likely one will be a farmer. This effect is evident for both men and women, but 
significantly larger for men in rural areas.  Having had either parent in the non-farm sector 
makes it less likely one will be a farmer, notably in rural areas, although the effect is far more 
pronounced for the mother in the case of rural men, while it is the father effect that is stronger for 
women.   
Parental schooling effects on the probability of being a farmer seem weak, though for 
rural women there is a significant positive effect of father‘s schooling and negative effect of 17 
 
mother‘s schooling (both significant at the 10% level). Own formal schooling makes it less likely 
that men will be in farming, but makes this more likely for women.  
We find that inheriting land makes farming more likely. However, this effect is confined 
to women in rural areas. Endogeneity is a concern here; as women rarely inherit land, those who 
remained in the same village as their parents and are in farming are more likely to be the ones 
who do inherit land. Inheriting land does not make it more likely that men will be farmers. We 
find no significant effects of inheriting a house. Other (non-land, non-housing) forms of 
inheritance are associated with lower probabilities of an adult being in agricultural self-
employment. This effect is found in both rural and urban areas, though it is stronger for rural 
areas (Table 8). The effect is similar in size for men and women, though only statistically 
significant for women. 
Table 9 reports analogous results for non-farm occupations. Having a mother in the non-
farm sector significantly enhances the probability of an adult working in the non-farm sector. 
Higher own schooling increases the probability for men (and it is a larger effect for men in rural 
areas) but not for women.  
We find no evidence that inheriting land has a significant effect on the likelihood of 
doing non-farm activities (Table 9) (although, as we will see, this changes when we allow land to 
be endogenous). However, inheritance of other (non-land, non-housing) assets makes it more 
likely that women will be employed in the non-farm sector, notably in urban areas (Table 11).  
A number of effects on mobility—identified by whether an adult lives in the same place 
as his or her parents—are evident in Table 10.  Having a farmer for a father makes a son‘s 
mobility more likely, though the effect is only significant for rural men.  Having a father who 
worked in the non-farm sector has the opposite effect—increasing the likelihood of living in the 
same place, though the effect is only significant for rural areas, and is larger for rural women. 
Having a father with formal schooling makes mobility more likely for urban men; having had a 
mother with schooling makes it more likely that a woman will live in the same place as her 
parents. Own formal schooling makes mobility more likely, though the effect is only significant 
for rural men and urban women.  
Inheriting land does not appear to have any significant effect on the probability of moving 
to a location different from where one‘s father resided in the sample as a whole (Table 10). 
However, there is a sign that inheriting land actually encourages such mobility for urban women. 18 
 
Inheriting a house makes it more likely a man living in rural areas will have the same residence 
as his parents—in a rather obvious way since the one brother who will inherit the house is the 
one who intends to live in it (or already does)—but there are no other significant effects of this 
form of inheritance. Nor are there any significant effects of other (non-land, non-housing) 
inheritance.  
Further tests of robustness 
Possibly the effect of inheritance is diluted by including in the sample cell heads whose 
parents are still alive, and cannot (of course) be a source of inheritance. We tested this possibility 
by only including cases where either the father or the mother is dead. Again we found no 
significant effect of inheriting land, though a positive effect of inheriting a house did emerge in 
the urban sample. ―Other inheritance‖ remained significant in the full sample, and is due to men. 
Other results were robust. 
The main results reported above were also found to be robust to dropping potentially 
endogenous variables (own-schooling, being fostered as a child and age at first marriage). The 
effects of maternal characteristics (sector and education) on the probability of being a farmer are 
stronger when one confines attention to the sample with either parent dead. This sub-sample 
reveals a stronger effect on non-farm employment of having parents who did non-farm work. 
Dropping own education reveals even weaker effects of parental education on sector of 
employment. 
We also tested sensitivity to allowing for an interaction effect between inheritance and 
the time since the father died; for those with a dead father, the mean time since death is 22 years 
(the median is 19). It is not clear on a priori grounds what one would expect. The inherited asset 
may have a positive rate of return allowing capital accumulation, though other factors may come 
into play; for example, there were clearly fewer options to farming for those who inherited the 
land a long time ago. Also, assets (including land) depreciate in value over time. Our tests 
involved simply adding an interaction effect between inheritance and years since the death of the 
father to the preceding regressions.
17 For cell consumption per capita, there was a negative 
interaction effect though only amongst urban men, for which the effect was significant at the 5% 
                                                           
17   If one assumes that the current value of a past inheritance in amount I is given by f(t)=[(1+r)(1-d)]
t (where r 
is the rate of return, d is the depreciation rate and t is the number of years since father‘s death) then the function f(t) 
can be approximated by a linear function of t with constant parameters if one takes its first-order Taylor series 
expansion and one assumes that r and d are common across all households. However, these are potentially strong 
assumptions, especially the constancy of returns. 19 
 
level. The total effect was positive up to about 30 years, though not significant even when the 
father died recently. For agricultural self-employment the interaction effect was often positive 
though generally not significant, except for urban men; for non-farm employment the pattern 
switched, with a negative interaction effect, though again not strong. However, allowing for such 
an interaction effect does not change our main findings reported above.  
Our assumption that past inheritance is exogenous to current living standards can be 
questioned. Choices about who inherits the land may be influenced by factors that are 
unobserved by us, but observed by the parents or other stakeholders—factors that are also 
correlated with the economic activity and economic welfare of the child on reaching adulthood.  
It may be decided by the family group that one of the sons is best suited to taking charge of the 
family farm on the father‘s death. This may reflect a latent interest or ability at farming, revealed 
while growing up. Or it may be that other sons show more aptitude for non-farm work.  Parents 
may also have gender preferences in their choices about inheritance and schooling—choices that 
are influenced by both market and non-market parameters.
18 Another potential source of 
endogeneity is the fact that children could possibly decline the inheritance, in particular of land, 
if taking care of it is not compatible with their preferred activity or if, being themselves 
economically successful, they feel that their siblings have a greater need for it. 
In testing the robustness of our results to treating inheritance as endogenous, the key 
identifying assumption we make is that the death of the father or mother only matters to an 
individual adult‘s current economic welfare via inheritance of land or other assets.  It is hard to 
see why parental death sometime in the past would matter to current adult consumption except 
via inheritance and (hence) wealth. Possibly the shock of parental death will have an impact, but 
then we control for a father‘s recent death (within the last two years) in all our regressions.  
We can only convincingly treat one inheritance variable as endogenous, solving out other 
endogenous variables.
19 We do so for any inheritance taken together, and separately for land, 
excluding other forms of inheritance. We also drop any variables that could be endogenous by 
the same logic, notably own education. (Parents may decide that one son gets the schooling 
while the other gets the land.) We also drop fostering and age at marriage for the same reason.   
                                                           
18   For example, using data from the rural Philippines, Estudillo et al. (2001) show how sons are preferred for 
land inheritance, while daughters are preferred for investments in schooling. 
19   We tried using death of father and death of mother as two IVs for two inheritance variables (land and other) 
but these did not have sufficient power for credible identification.  20 
 
Table 11 gives the IV estimates for each of the dependent variables used in the previous 
tables.
20 (Note that the estimator is not feasible for the sub-sample for which the father is dead.)  
Our results on land inheritance are reasonably robust to relaxing the exogeneity assumption 
using these IVs.  In particular, we still find that land inheritance does not convey any significant 
consumption benefit.  
However, we now find that land inheritance tends to encourage a shift from farm to non-
farm work, suggesting that there was a downward bias in the earlier estimates (Table 9). On 
investigating this effect further we find that it is present for both the sub-samples that are heads 
of households and those that are not, but that it was far stronger (in size and statistical 
significance) for those who are not heads of household. Table 11 gives a split of the results for 
non-farm activities according to whether or not the cell head is also the overall household head.
21 
The difference is even more pronounced if confined to men only; the IV coefficients on land 
inheritance are 0.460 (s.e.=0.333) for male heads of household as compared to 1.374 (s.e.=0.445) 
for male non-heads. The latter sub-sample tends to be comprised of married brothers of 
household heads. When land inheritance comes without the responsibilities of headship it 
appears to be an important factor in encouraging diversification into non-farm activities. 
We found that the absence of a significant impact of land inheritance, once instrumented, 
on the probability of being in farming was true for all the sub-samples we considered (men, 
women, household heads). Furthermore, on running the same regressions using as the measure of 
inheritance whether or not the individual received any inheritance of any type, the results were 
qualitatively very similar to those for land inheritance.  
Implications for explaining inequality 
It is clear from these results that bequests can play little role in perpetuating consumption 
inequality. However, other parental characteristics clearly do matter, both directly and via adult 
characteristics, notably education. Table 12 presents decompositions of consumption inequality 
implied by the regressions in Table 6. (Appendix 2 explains how the decompositions were done.) 
Far more important to inequality than inheritance is ―own schooling,‖ which contributes 
9% to overall consumption inequality (almost one fifth of the explained component). The share 
                                                           
20   For consumption, we also used the treatment effects model (the ―treatreg‖ estimator in STATA) which uses 
full maximum likelihood to estimate the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment on another endogenous 
continuous variable, conditional on two sets of independent variables. This gave very similar results. 
21   No such interaction effects were evident for the other dependent variables in Table 11. 21 
 
is even higher for women. Demographics, especially cell size and the proportion of adults, also 
emerge as large contributors to inequality, especially in rural areas; this probably reflects 
differences in the available labor force. In the national sample, almost half of the explained 
inequality is attributable to rural-urban location. 
5.  Conclusions 
  We find evidence of significant intergenerational linkages in this setting. This is evident 
in the correlations between parents‘ and children‘s sectors of occupation, which persist on adding 
controls for heterogeneity in other respects. Nonetheless, there is still considerable 
intergenerational mobility, both across sectors and residentially, which appears to be primarily 
associated with the transition from farm to non-farm activities.  Only one third of the sons of 
farmers stayed in farming.  And adult women in our sample are far more economically active 
than were their mothers. 
Our results suggest that gender plays an important role. There is consumption inequality 
between men and women, though this is largely accountable to factors such as education. The 
intergenerational linkages through the mother appear to be stronger than those through the 
father—including on the son‘s economic activity.  Educated mothers are more likely to have 
sons in the non-farm sector.  While women with formal schooling are no more likely to be in 
non-farm employment and (slightly) more likely to be farmers, it is their sons who are more 
likely to find their way into the non-farm sector.   
If we assume conditional exogeneity of inheritance (with a wide range of controls), it 
seems that inheriting the land makes it more likely that a woman will stay a farmer, but not so for 
men. Inheriting other (non-land, non-housing) assets appears to help get women into non-farm 
work, but there is no such effect for men. However, endogeneity bias might partly account for 
those results. When we allow for the possible endogeneity of inheritance by assuming that the 
death of a parent only matters via inheritance (though allowing for the short-term shock of 
parental death) we find evidence that inheritance does play a role in facilitating diversification 
into non-farm activities, although this is only present for men who do not also inherit the 
responsibilities of being the overall head of the household. The potential wealth effect of an 
inheritance on activity choice seems to be inhibited by the obligations attendant to household 
headship. 22 
 
  On average, inheriting the land or house brings no significant gain to an adult‘s 
consumption. It appears that intra-household allocation across generations comes fairly close to 
equalizing consumption between otherwise identical individuals, only one of whom takes on the 
responsibility for the family‘s land and housing assets, However, we find that there are 
significant gains from inheriting other (non-land and non-housing) assets. Formal schooling 
appears to yield much higher returns. 
  In short, while inter-generational linkages clearly matter, there still appears to be 
considerable inter-generational mobility in this setting. Inheritance of land or housing contributes 
very little to overall inequality, and does not appear to be an important channel for enhancing 
economic efficiency through transfers of ownership. Non-land inheritance, schooling and 
parental characteristics (especially the mother‘s) appear to play a far more important role.  23 
 
Table 1: Inheritance, by gender 
Among individual heads 
of cells whose father or 
mother is dead 
Men  Women  All  t-test of the 
difference 
(women-men) 
Father has left any form 
of inheritance 




71.84%  -4.02 
Father has transmitted 
land to this person 




35.19%  -8.48 






21.72%  0.46 
Mother has transmitted 
land to this person 
4.49%    
(38) 
3.35%   
(29) 
3.92%  -1.21 
  Note: number of observations in brackets. 24 
 
Table 2: Sectoral occupational mobility across generations for men and women 
No. observations 
(% of all individuals) 
Men  Women 
Farm  Non-farm  Inactive  Total  Farm  Non-farm  Inactive  Total 
Father‘s occupation                 
Farm  216  313  113  642  228  273  398  899 
  (11.37)  (16.47)  (5.95)  (33.79)  (9.12)  (10.92)  (15.91)  (35.95) 
                 
Non-farm  55  413  96  564  46  397  387  830 
  (2.89)  (21.74)  (5.05)  (29.68)  (1.84)  (15.87)  (15.47)  (33.19) 
                 
Inactive  192  347  155  694  114  231  427  772 
  (10.11)  (18.26)  (8.16)  (36.53)  (4.56)  (9.24)  (17.07)  (30.87) 
                 
Total  463  1,073  364  1,900  388  901  1,212  2,501 
  (24.37)  (56.47)  (19.16)  (100.00)  (15.51)  (36.03)  (48.46)  (100.00) 
Cramer‘s V        0.178        0.184 
Mother‘s occupation                 
Farm  154  133  68  355  185  168  203  556 
  (8.11)  (7.00)  (3.58)  (18.68)  (7.40)  (6.72)  (8.12)  (22.23) 
                 
Non-farm  20  200  40  260  20  215  178  413 
  (1.05)  (10.53)  (2.11)  (13.68)  (0.80)  (8.60)  (7.12)  (16.51) 
                 
Inactive  289  740  256  1.285  183  518  831  1.532 
  (15.21)  (38.95)  (13.47)  (67.63)  (7.32)  (20.71)  (33.23)  (61.26) 
                 
Total  463  1,073  364  1,900  388  901  1,212  2,501 
  (24.37)  (56.47)  (19.16)  (100.00)  (15.51)  (36.03)  (48.46)  (100.00) 
Cramer‘s V        0.184        0.211 25 
 
 
Table 3: Marginal determinants of the probability of any inheritance 
   All  Men  Women 
Male  0.111***  0.136***  --  --  --  -- 
  (0.0338)  (0.0258)         
Age  -0.00270  0.00183  0.00742  0.0144**  -0.00201  0.00148 
  (0.00498)  (0.00433)  (0.00745)  (0.00660)  (0.00614)  (0.00550) 
Age squared  2.04e-05  -1.71e-05  -7.66e-05  -0.000133**  1.22e-05  -2.37e-05 
  (4.70e-05)  (4.16e-05)  (6.81e-05)  (6.13e-05)  (6.06e-05)  (5.54e-05) 
Muslim  0.219***  0.183***  0.275***  0.239**  0.202***  0.167*** 
  (0.0530)  (0.0510)  (0.0960)  (0.0945)  (0.0478)  (0.0467) 
Serere ethnicity  -0.0806**  -0.0637*  -0.0529  -0.0447  -0.114***  -0.0896** 
  (0.0406)  (0.0380)  (0.0637)  (0.0609)  (0.0428)  (0.0403) 
Poular ethnicity  0.00583  0.00770  0.0568  0.0488  -0.0461  -0.0220 
  (0.0374)  (0.0348)  (0.0509)  (0.0493)  (0.0432)  (0.0402) 
Diola ethnicity  0.0481  0.00466  -0.0456  -0.0712  0.129  0.0680 
  (0.0849)  (0.0749)  (0.107)  (0.0990)  (0.103)  (0.0882) 
Mandingue ethnicity  0.0165  0.00655  0.0563  0.0178  -0.0284  -0.0105 
  (0.0515)  (0.0493)  (0.0795)  (0.0766)  (0.0537)  (0.0530) 
Sarakole ethnicity  0.0408  0.0636  0.0477  0.149  0.0300  0.00827 
  (0.111)  (0.101)  (0.137)  (0.119)  (0.144)  (0.128) 
Mandiaque ethnicity  0.187  0.106  0.256  0.231  0.144  0.0475 
  (0.167)  (0.157)  (0.184)  (0.199)  (0.189)  (0.158) 
Other ethnicity  -0.110  -0.120*  -0.112  -0.117  -0.111  -0.113* 
  (0.0749)  (0.0642)  (0.123)  (0.110)  (0.0790)  (0.0680) 
Brothers same father  -0.000258  2.14e-05  -0.00760  -0.00741  0.00940  0.00987 
  (0.00675)  (0.00645)  (0.0106)  (0.0105)  (0.00811)  (0.00756) 
Brothers same parents  -0.00319  -0.000256  -0.0154  -0.0155  0.00127  0.00808 
  (0.00754)  (0.00710)  (0.0122)  (0.0115)  (0.00928)  (0.00859) 
Sisters same father   0.0235***  0.0224***  0.0317***  0.0359***  0.0144*  0.0105 
  (0.00692)  (0.00661)  (0.0111)  (0.0110)  (0.00837)  (0.00767) 
Sisters same parents  0.0132*  0.0142**  0.0268**  0.0267**  0.00634  0.00555 
  (0.00744)  (0.00697)  (0.0110)  (0.0106)  (0.00909)  (0.00854) 
Brothers same mother   -0.0337**  -0.0186  -0.00547  0.00591  -0.0523***  -0.0350** 
  (0.0148)  (0.0137)  (0.0242)  (0.0232)  (0.0194)  (0.0172) 
Sisters same mother  -0.00430  -0.0183  -0.0280  -0.0377  0.00334  -0.00792 
  (0.0151)  (0.0140)  (0.0267)  (0.0232)  (0.0171)  (0.0167) 
First same gender  0.0289  0.0125  -0.0272  -0.0455  0.0597  0.0469 
  (0.0295)  (0.0274)  (0.0542)  (0.0519)  (0.0387)  (0.0353) 
First of siblings  -0.0146  -0.00173  -0.0140  0.0195  -0.0284  -0.0378 
  (0.0321)  (0.0303)  (0.0611)  (0.0585)  (0.0465)  (0.0426) 
First born is male  0.0263  0.0175  0.0859*  0.0729  0.00954  -0.0168 
  (0.0239)  (0.0227)  (0.0475)  (0.0464)  (0.0327)  (0.0294) 
Father died recently  -0.111***  -0.111***  -0.153**  -0.193***  -0.0887**  -0.0648* 
  (0.0376)  (0.0343)  (0.0688)  (0.0597)  (0.0405)  (0.0389) 
Father is dead  0.674***  0.658***  0.734***  0.717***  0.637***  0.618*** 
  (0.0155)  (0.0147)  (0.0208)  (0.0206)  (0.0199)  (0.0189) 
Mother is dead  0.147***  0.144***  0.152***  0.152***  0.149***  0.147*** 
  (0.0279)  (0.0264)  (0.0424)  (0.0404)  (0.0346)  (0.0324) 
Father in farming  -0.0134  -0.0109  0.0381  0.0509  -0.0479  -0.0478 26 
 
  (0.0299)  (0.0280)  (0.0433)  (0.0409)  (0.0354)  (0.0333) 
Mother in farm.  0.0351  0.0525  0.00198  0.00792  0.0628  0.0815** 
  (0.0351)  (0.0331)  (0.0519)  (0.0497)  (0.0442)  (0.0411) 
Father in non-farm  0.0357  0.0482  0.00456  0.0149  0.0500  0.0576 
  (0.0341)  (0.0321)  (0.0496)  (0.0479)  (0.0420)  (0.0388) 
Mother in non-farm  0.0776**  0.0753**  0.140***  0.143***  0.0318  0.0281 
  (0.0370)  (0.0344)  (0.0509)  (0.0484)  (0.0441)  (0.0400) 
Father‘s schooling  0.0147  0.0181  0.0612  0.0735  -0.0103  -0.00847 
  (0.0414)  (0.0381)  (0.0602)  (0.0571)  (0.0486)  (0.0445) 
Mother‘s schooling  -0.0360  0.00307  -0.132  -0.0900  0.0123  0.0450 
  (0.0532)  (0.0487)  (0.0858)  (0.0797)  (0.0639)  (0.0593) 
Father rural  -0.0466  -0.0574  -0.114  -0.142**  -0.00319  -0.0135 
  (0.0487)  (0.0447)  (0.0752)  (0.0706)  (0.0555)  (0.0516) 
Mother rural  0.0603  0.0782*  0.145*  0.161**  0.0163  0.0319 
  (0.0473)  (0.0436)  (0.0757)  (0.0721)  (0.0541)  (0.0498) 
Log hh size  0.0333  0.0187  0.0562  0.0249  0.0146  0.000344 
  (0.0229)  (0.0204)  (0.0344)  (0.0311)  (0.0265)  (0.0240) 
Log cell size  0.0347  0.0370*  0.0597  0.0591  0.000396  0.0168 
  (0.0236)  (0.0218)  (0.0394)  (0.0369)  (0.0334)  (0.0300) 
Share of cell aged<5  0.0101  0.0436  -0.135  0.000953  0.0204  0.0204 
  (0.0860)  (0.0776)  (0.167)  (0.155)  (0.0956)  (0.0842) 
Share of cell adults  -0.0182  0.0133  0.0190  0.0285  -0.0727  -0.00214 
  (0.0630)  (0.0584)  (0.112)  (0.106)  (0.0766)  (0.0688) 
Has formal schooling  0.0582*  --  0.0869**  --  0.0477  -- 
  (0.0314)    (0.0441)    (0.0416)   
Fostered  0.00747  --  0.00408  --  -0.0101  -- 
  (0.0424)    (0.0587)    (0.0601)   
Fostered young  0.0171  --  0.0722  --  -0.0224  -- 
  (0.0555)    (0.0909)    (0.0679)   
Age at first marriage  0.00363  --  0.00441  --  0.00165  -- 
  (0.00233)    (0.00326)    (0.00313)   
Rural  0.0110  -0.0316  0.110  0.0733  -0.0803  -0.110** 
  (0.0507)  (0.0475)  (0.0708)  (0.0685)  (0.0565)  (0.0514) 
No. Observations  3,150  3,524  1,415  1,548  1,735  1,997 
Pseudo R
2  0.374  0.373  0.407  0.404  0.381  0.380 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The variables ‗First same gender‘, ‗First of siblings‘ and ‗First born is male‘ all refer to children of the same 
father, same mother. The regression also includes department fixed effects. 
 27 
 
Table 4: Marginal determinants of the probability of land inheritance 
 
  All  Men  Women 
Male  0.0748***  0.0779***  --  --  --  -- 
  (0.0187)  (0.0147)         
Age  -0.00359  -0.00248  -0.000444  -0.000990  -0.00249  -0.00163 
  (0.00267)  (0.00215)  (0.00521)  (0.00435)  (0.00225)  (0.00167) 
Age squared  3.75e-05  3.06e-05  8.78e-06  1.65e-05  2.43e-05  2.05e-05 
  (2.47e-05)  (2.03e-05)  (4.66e-05)  (3.95e-05)  (2.18e-05)  (1.67e-05) 
Muslim  0.0620***  0.0506***  0.0958**  0.0817**  0.0422***  0.0326*** 
  (0.0206)  (0.0178)  (0.0432)  (0.0417)  (0.0142)  (0.0115) 
Serere ethnicity  0.0310  0.0189  0.0889*  0.0651  0.00322  -5.75e-05 
  (0.0249)  (0.0207)  (0.0508)  (0.0447)  (0.0189)  (0.0142) 
Poular ethnicity  0.00156  -0.00125  0.0356  0.0172  -0.0132  -0.00503 
  (0.0184)  (0.0157)  (0.0354)  (0.0314)  (0.0150)  (0.0122) 
Diola ethnicity  0.0585  0.0365  0.00777  0.0124  0.0913  0.0434 
  (0.0625)  (0.0487)  (0.0832)  (0.0748)  (0.0768)  (0.0488) 
Mandingue ethnicity  0.0284  0.0184  0.0576  0.0196  0.00548  0.00777 
  (0.0312)  (0.0262)  (0.0607)  (0.0507)  (0.0230)  (0.0193) 
Sarakole ethnicity  -0.0133  -0.0123  -0.0120  0.0121  -0.0113  -0.0113 
  (0.0475)  (0.0373)  (0.0893)  (0.0768)  (0.0338)  (0.0247) 
Mandiaque ethnicity  0.250  0.204  0.442  0.445  0.150  0.0799 
  (0.229)  (0.200)  (0.303)  (0.317)  (0.176)  (0.118) 
Other ethnicity  -0.0405  -0.0292  -0.00740  -0.0181  -0.0414***  -0.0276** 
  (0.0334)  (0.0282)  (0.0785)  (0.0635)  (0.0154)  (0.0137) 
Brothers same father  0.00630*  0.00476  0.00747  0.00470  0.00655**  0.00473** 
  (0.00333)  (0.00292)  (0.00675)  (0.00623)  (0.00293)  (0.00239) 
Brothers same 
parents  -0.000305  -0.00111  -0.00412  -0.00522  -0.00114  -0.000291 
  (0.00408)  (0.00346)  (0.00844)  (0.00745)  (0.00364)  (0.00283) 
Sisters same father   0.00386  0.00523*  0.0120*  0.0155**  -0.000384  0.000449 
  (0.00346)  (0.00298)  (0.00693)  (0.00625)  (0.00300)  (0.00237) 
Sisters same parents  0.00669*  0.00586*  0.0178**  0.0169**  0.000874  9.87e-05 
  (0.00386)  (0.00324)  (0.00743)  (0.00668)  (0.00349)  (0.00277) 
Brothers same 
mother   -0.0149**  -0.0160**  0.00604  -0.00185  -0.0269***  -0.0224*** 
  (0.00741)  (0.00642)  (0.0164)  (0.0154)  (0.00821)  (0.00674) 
Sisters same mother  -0.00548  -0.00466  -0.0208  -0.0128  -0.00119  -0.000725 
  (0.00845)  (0.00694)  (0.0172)  (0.0148)  (0.00685)  (0.00544) 
First same gender  0.0168  0.00978  0.00467  0.000149  0.0190  0.0114 
  (0.0149)  (0.0127)  (0.0356)  (0.0321)  (0.0148)  (0.0118) 
First of siblings  -0.00495  -0.000204  -0.0170  -0.0103  0.00292  0.00665 
  (0.0164)  (0.0144)  (0.0394)  (0.0361)  (0.0175)  (0.0146) 
First born is male  0.0154  0.0112  0.0531*  0.0395  0.00628  0.00392 
  (0.0125)  (0.0106)  (0.0289)  (0.0269)  (0.0123)  (0.00958) 
Father died recently  -0.0397**  -0.0346**  -0.0922***  -0.0802***  -0.0193  -0.0141 
  (0.0161)  (0.0135)  (0.0303)  (0.0263)  (0.0127)  (0.0102) 
Father is dead  0.334***  0.317***  0.429***  0.412***  0.259***  0.234*** 
  (0.0141)  (0.0133)  (0.0196)  (0.0190)  (0.0179)  (0.0163) 
Mother is dead  0.0364**  0.0257*  0.0674**  0.0558**  0.0177  0.00852 
  (0.0158)  (0.0135)  (0.0289)  (0.0262)  (0.0140)  (0.0106) 
Father in farming  -0.0122  -0.00769  0.00233  0.0128  -0.0151  -0.0118 
  (0.0149)  (0.0128)  (0.0283)  (0.0253)  (0.0130)  (0.0104) 
Mother in farm.  0.0465**  0.0471***  0.0953**  0.0810**  0.0211  0.0244* 28 
 
  (0.0201)  (0.0176)  (0.0411)  (0.0372)  (0.0169)  (0.0141) 
Father in non-farm  -0.0577***  -0.0514***  -0.0845***  -0.0746***  -0.0383***  -0.0330*** 
  (0.0167)  (0.0144)  (0.0310)  (0.0278)  (0.0144)  (0.0117) 
Mother in non-farm  0.000288  0.00290  0.0154  0.0147  -0.00356  -0.00374 
  (0.0206)  (0.0177)  (0.0424)  (0.0382)  (0.0165)  (0.0130) 
Father‘s schooling  -0.00155  -0.00489  -0.0590  -0.0667*  0.0213  0.0156 
  (0.0245)  (0.0202)  (0.0413)  (0.0351)  (0.0255)  (0.0201) 
Mother‘s schooling  -0.00649  -0.0138  -0.0434  -0.0282  0.00812  -0.0126 
  (0.0312)  (0.0236)  (0.0537)  (0.0481)  (0.0335)  (0.0186) 
Father rural  0.0398*  0.0283  0.0158  -0.000487  0.0392**  0.0289* 
  (0.0227)  (0.0193)  (0.0483)  (0.0436)  (0.0184)  (0.0149) 
Mother rural  0.0486**  0.0543***  0.0865*  0.0876**  0.0216  0.0270* 
  (0.0228)  (0.0193)  (0.0466)  (0.0416)  (0.0192)  (0.0153) 
Log hh size  0.0347***  0.0209**  0.0655***  0.0385**  0.0156  0.00842 
  (0.0121)  (0.00967)  (0.0230)  (0.0195)  (0.0103)  (0.00777) 
Log cell size  0.00386  0.00511  -0.00968  -0.0122  -0.00406  0.000672 
  (0.0115)  (0.00951)  (0.0251)  (0.0223)  (0.0116)  (0.00878) 
Share of cell aged<5  -0.0625  -0.0535  -0.274**  -0.241**  -0.0228  -0.0143 
  (0.0451)  (0.0378)  (0.131)  (0.116)  (0.0330)  (0.0253) 
Share of cell adults  -0.0299  -0.0221  -0.161**  -0.148**  -0.0135  -0.00708 
  (0.0326)  (0.0276)  (0.0768)  (0.0692)  (0.0264)  (0.0205) 
Has formal 
schooling  -0.0213  --  -0.0119  --  -0.0232*  -- 
  (0.0145)    (0.0286)    (0.0119)   
Fostered  0.0489**  --  0.119**  --  -0.0211  -- 
  (0.0244)    (0.0488)    (0.0174)   
Fostered young  -0.0537***  --  -0.108***  --  -0.00254  -- 
  (0.0200)    (0.0344)    (0.0257)   
Age at first marriage  0.000873  --  0.00210  --  -0.000342  -- 
  (0.00111)    (0.00195)    (0.00125)   
Rural  0.0114  0.00836  0.0769*  0.0748*  -0.0170  -0.0141 
  (0.0247)  (0.0209)  (0.0452)  (0.0401)  (0.0201)  (0.0154) 
No. observations  3,150  3,524  1,415  1,548  1,699  1,976 
Pseudo R
2  0.378  0.363  0.389  0.388  0.359  0.367 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The variables ‗First same gender‘, ‗First of siblings‘ and ‗First born is male‘ all refer to children of 
the same father, same mother. Regressions also contain regional (department) dummies.  The reference 
variables are Wolof ethnicity, all other religions, occupation ‗inactive‘,  share of cell members 5-15,  no 
and non-formal schooling. 
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Table 5: Estimated effects of inheritance on log cell per capita consumption with and 
without controls 
 






As in (2) + controls for 
individual and household 
characteristics 
           
Inherited land  -0.482***  -0.0620  -0.0655 
 
(0.0702)  (0.0572)  (0.0585) 
Inherited house  0.327***  0.0955*  0.0515 
 
(0.0606)  (0.0488)  (0.0498) 
Other inheritance  0.0631  0.167***  0.106** 
 
(0.0656)  (0.0521)  (0.0526) 
Constant  11.45***  12.28***  11.91*** 
 
(0.0381)  (0.303)  (0.383) 
Observations  4,326  4,326  3,558 
R
2  0.016  0.376  0.499 
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Table 6: Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita 
           









                 
Male  0.0137  0.000143  0.0711  --  -- 
  (0.0562)  (0.0770)  (0.0850)     
Age  0.00472  0.0107  0.00586  0.0264  -0.0274** 
  (0.00963)  (0.0127)  (0.0140)  (0.0161)  (0.0116) 
Age squared  -0.000111  -0.000217  -6.26e-05  -0.000352**  0.000289** 
  (9.89e-05)  (0.000132)  (0.000139)  (0.000155)  (0.000121) 
Muslim  0.223*  -0.154  0.343**  0.304*  0.165 
  (0.124)  (0.224)  (0.137)  (0.184)  (0.127) 
Serere ethnicity  -0.350***  -0.610***  -0.156*  -0.461***  -0.243** 
  (0.0827)  (0.147)  (0.0914)  (0.109)  (0.0968) 
Poular ethnicity  -0.114  -0.222**  -0.0258  -0.213**  -0.0288 
  (0.0699)  (0.113)  (0.0860)  (0.0957)  (0.0786) 
Diola ethnicity  -0.265*  -0.567  -0.0682  -0.118  -0.366** 
  (0.156)  (0.534)  (0.152)  (0.221)  (0.151) 
Mandingue ethnicity  -0.125  -0.0702  -0.164  -0.156  -0.0884 
  (0.0966)  (0.159)  (0.117)  (0.134)  (0.105) 
Sarakole ethnicity  -0.00777  0.0638  0.0186  -0.0864  0.0374 
  (0.167)  (0.299)  (0.228)  (0.230)  (0.187) 
Mandiaque ethnicity  -0.362*  -0.551***  -0.190  -0.0677  -0.459** 
  (0.190)  (0.163)  (0.250)  (0.285)  (0.225) 
Other ethnicity  0.0434  0.0361  -0.0897  0.220  -0.0854 
  (0.142)  (0.200)  (0.145)  (0.189)  (0.143) 
Brothers same father  0.00307  -0.00771  0.00710  0.00506  -0.000408 
  (0.0109)  (0.0148)  (0.0160)  (0.0182)  (0.0135) 
Brothers same parents  0.0157  0.0176  0.00880  0.0312  0.00431 
  (0.0134)  (0.0190)  (0.0190)  (0.0207)  (0.0171) 
Sisters same father   -0.00188  -0.00907  0.000743  0.00145  0.00182 
  (0.0111)  (0.0163)  (0.0153)  (0.0195)  (0.0132) 
Sisters same parents  0.0286**  0.0365*  0.0276*  0.0183  0.0379** 
  (0.0126)  (0.0209)  (0.0164)  (0.0200)  (0.0167) 
Brothers same mother   0.0215  -0.0416  0.0573*  0.0181  0.0270 
  (0.0244)  (0.0428)  (0.0297)  (0.0380)  (0.0312) 
Sisters same mother  0.00623  0.0337  -0.00222  -0.0210  0.0117 
  (0.0292)  (0.0424)  (0.0404)  (0.0451)  (0.0361) 
First same gender  0.00601  0.0437  -0.0336  0.0467  -0.0108 
  (0.0468)  (0.0667)  (0.0660)  (0.0882)  (0.0657) 
First of siblings  -0.0228  -0.117*  0.0842  -0.0870  0.0397 
  (0.0520)  (0.0704)  (0.0788)  (0.0964)  (0.0809) 
First born is male  0.0545  0.0895  0.0153  0.0723  0.0898 
  (0.0417)  (0.0570)  (0.0583)  (0.0865)  (0.0560) 
Father died recently  -0.0578  -0.0145  -0.0761  -0.111  -0.0853 
  (0.0850)  (0.128)  (0.112)  (0.165)  (0.0920) 
Father in farming  0.170***  0.153**  0.192**  0.215***  0.108 
  (0.0574)  (0.0722)  (0.0952)  (0.0822)  (0.0692) 
Mother in farm.  -0.0145  0.0552  -0.109  -0.168*  0.108 
  (0.0600)  (0.0769)  (0.0952)  (0.0875)  (0.0731) 
Father in non-farm  0.295***  0.315***  0.259***  0.386***  0.217*** 
  (0.0593)  (0.0962)  (0.0776)  (0.0862)  (0.0728) 
Mother in non-farm  -0.0823  0.131  -0.171**  -0.119  -0.0608 31 
 
  (0.0619)  (0.100)  (0.0797)  (0.0994)  (0.0727) 
Father‘s schooling  0.0367  -0.249**  0.110  0.0925  0.00213 
  (0.0702)  (0.124)  (0.0813)  (0.121)  (0.0818) 
Mother‘s schooling  0.265***  0.205  0.371***  0.182  0.303** 
  (0.0933)  (0.184)  (0.113)  (0.144)  (0.125) 
Father rural  0.0958  0.102  0.0347  0.130  0.0718 
  (0.0725)  (0.114)  (0.0937)  (0.138)  (0.0830) 
Mother rural  -0.129*  -0.108  -0.119  -0.104  -0.143* 
  (0.0699)  (0.107)  (0.0945)  (0.134)  (0.0808) 
Log hh size  -0.154***  -0.0743  -0.245***  -0.129**  -0.167*** 
  (0.0430)  (0.0646)  (0.0563)  (0.0561)  (0.0518) 
Log cell size  -0.246***  -0.417***  -0.164***  -0.234***  -0.212*** 
  (0.0398)  (0.0620)  (0.0523)  (0.0688)  (0.0590) 
Share of cell aged<5  -0.563***  -0.579***  -0.440**  -0.784***  -0.561*** 
  (0.141)  (0.196)  (0.205)  (0.301)  (0.166) 
Share of cell adults  0.696***  0.371**  0.824***  0.627***  0.671*** 
  (0.116)  (0.168)  (0.162)  (0.214)  (0.139) 
Has formal schooling  0.400***  0.336***  0.396***  0.315***  0.468*** 
  (0.0497)  (0.0843)  (0.0620)  (0.0761)  (0.0662) 
Fostered  0.187**  0.123  0.199*  0.305***  0.0413 
  (0.0751)  (0.109)  (0.103)  (0.110)  (0.101) 
Fostered young  -0.0334  0.00367  -0.0545  -0.298**  0.177 
  (0.0966)  (0.142)  (0.130)  (0.150)  (0.130) 
Age at first marriage  0.00422  0.0118**  -0.00149  -0.00420  0.0173*** 
  (0.00395)  (0.00590)  (0.00523)  (0.00534)  (0.00537) 
Inherited land  -0.0527  0.0410  -0.0959  -0.0825  0.00956 
  (0.0609)  (0.0858)  (0.0896)  (0.0910)  (0.0762) 
Inherited house  0.0164  -0.104  0.0962  0.00775  0.0160 
  (0.0519)  (0.0836)  (0.0666)  (0.0765)  (0.0650) 
Other inheritance  0.126**  0.137**  0.0914  0.237***  0.0189 
  (0.0547)  (0.0674)  (0.0860)  (0.0758)  (0.0685) 
Rural  -0.670***      -0.669***  -0.722*** 
  (0.0896)      (0.125)  (0.100) 
Constant  11.68***  10.55***  10.63***  11.26***  12.15*** 
  (0.379)  (0.727)  (0.539)  (0.627)  (0.461) 
Observations  3,165  1,637  1,528  1,419  1,746 
R
2  0.504  0.301  0.394  0.479  0.529 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, and are clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The variables ‗First same gender‘, ‗First of siblings‘ and ‗First born is male‘ all refer to 
children of the same father, same mother. Regressions also contain regional (department) dummies.  The 
reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, all other religions, occupation ‗inactive‘,  share of cell members 5-
15,  no and non-formal schooling. 
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Table 7: Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita by gender and rural/urban 
residence 
         
   (1) Rural   (2) Rural   (3) Urban  (4) Urban 
  men  women  men  women 
Age  0.0239  -0.0170  0.0344  -0.0247 
  (0.0232)  (0.0143)  (0.0212)  (0.0181) 
Age squared  -0.000393*  0.000163 
-
0.000343*  0.000300 
  (0.000222)  (0.000148)  (0.000203)  (0.000185) 
Muslim  -0.265  -0.106  0.473**  0.245 
  (0.290)  (0.233)  (0.194)  (0.163) 
Serere ethnicity  -0.822***  -0.458***  -0.249*  -0.0306 
  (0.189)  (0.164)  (0.135)  (0.118) 
Poular ethnicity  -0.353**  -0.129  -0.0922  0.0166 
  (0.149)  (0.133)  (0.126)  (0.0994) 
Diola ethnicity  -0.532  -0.525  0.159  -0.219 
  (0.547)  (0.673)  (0.237)  (0.146) 
Mandingue ethnicity  -0.0685  -0.0484  -0.217  -0.137 
  (0.200)  (0.181)  (0.182)  (0.129) 
Sarakole ethnicity  -0.0465  0.332  0.0841  -0.00152 
  (0.516)  (0.463)  (0.309)  (0.218) 
Mandiaque ethnicity  -0.553  -0.593***  0.336  -0.363 
  (0.382)  (0.180)  (0.342)  (0.314) 
Other ethnicity  0.0997  -0.0493  0.136  -0.255 
  (0.253)  (0.225)  (0.215)  (0.157) 
Brothers same father  -0.00759  -0.00231  0.0186  -0.00920 
  (0.0263)  (0.0182)  (0.0258)  (0.0209) 
Brothers same parents  0.0302  0.00264  0.0300  -0.00723 
  (0.0315)  (0.0241)  (0.0287)  (0.0252) 
Sisters same father   -0.0278  0.00545  0.0128  0.00100 
  (0.0295)  (0.0189)  (0.0256)  (0.0196) 
Sisters same parents  0.0287  0.0516*  0.00979  0.0414* 
  (0.0314)  (0.0275)  (0.0266)  (0.0223) 
Brothers same mother   -0.0556  -0.0386  0.0858**  0.0382 
  (0.0764)  (0.0528)  (0.0402)  (0.0406) 
Sisters same mother  0.0814  0.00493  -0.0801*  0.0323 
  (0.0954)  (0.0372)  (0.0440)  (0.0569) 
First same gender  0.0862  0.0477  0.0910  -0.0959 
  (0.120)  (0.0960)  (0.121)  (0.0937) 
First of siblings  -0.191  -0.0484  -0.0309  0.160 
  (0.135)  (0.107)  (0.135)  (0.127) 
First born is male  0.183  0.114  0.00841  0.0584 
  (0.118)  (0.0739)  (0.120)  (0.0870) 
Father died recently  -0.137  -0.00607  -0.0534  -0.149 
  (0.250)  (0.157)  (0.227)  (0.113) 
Father in farming  0.114  0.170**  0.407***  -0.0131 
  (0.107)  (0.0852)  (0.131)  (0.126) 
Mother in farm.  -0.0397  0.147  -0.399***  0.113 
  (0.114)  (0.0899)  (0.148)  (0.130) 
Father in non-farm  0.443***  0.196*  0.384***  0.148 
  (0.134)  (0.118)  (0.109)  (0.102) 
Mother in non-farm  -0.0221  0.291**  -0.158  -0.185** 
  (0.143)  (0.140)  (0.130)  (0.0917) 33 
 
Father‘s schooling  -0.386  -0.0897  0.225  0.0521 
  (0.246)  (0.149)  (0.140)  (0.0971) 
Mother‘s schooling  0.270  0.0745  0.255  0.425*** 
  (0.279)  (0.227)  (0.183)  (0.153) 
Father rural  0.329  0.0238  -0.0932  0.0946 
  (0.262)  (0.122)  (0.164)  (0.111) 
Mother rural  -0.399  -0.00812  0.0434  -0.212* 
  (0.259)  (0.118)  (0.160)  (0.116) 
Log hh size  0.0667  -0.174**  -0.309***  -0.176** 
  (0.0890)  (0.0752)  (0.0719)  (0.0756) 
Log cell size  -0.458***  -0.349***  -0.104  -0.202** 
  (0.108)  (0.0880)  (0.0918)  (0.0862) 
Share of cell aged<5  -1.079**  -0.484**  -0.293  -0.580** 
  (0.425)  (0.232)  (0.455)  (0.241) 
Share of cell adults  0.246  0.334  0.815***  0.716*** 
  (0.307)  (0.203)  (0.311)  (0.205) 
Has formal schooling  0.189  0.446***  0.327***  0.446*** 
  (0.124)  (0.114)  (0.101)  (0.0827) 
Fostered  0.270*  -0.0535  0.350**  0.0617 
  (0.151)  (0.174)  (0.169)  (0.125) 
Fostered young  -0.301  0.228  -0.293  0.172 
  (0.221)  (0.203)  (0.218)  (0.166) 
Age at first marriage  0.00190  0.0273***  -0.0114  0.0111 
  (0.00881)  (0.00760)  (0.00697)  (0.00799) 
Inherited land  0.00869  0.113  -0.156  -0.0340 
  (0.121)  (0.113)  (0.147)  (0.111) 
Inherited house  -0.165  -0.0896  0.150  0.0746 
  (0.111)  (0.110)  (0.110)  (0.0822) 
Other inheritance  0.259***  0.0293  0.176  -0.0160 
  (0.0982)  (0.0796)  (0.122)  (0.110) 
Constant  11.31***  11.65***  9.912***  11.94*** 
  (1.124)  (0.627)  (0.733)  (0.563) 
Observations  733  904  686  842 
R
2  0.297  0.321  0.385  0.395 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,  clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The variables ‗First same gender‘, ‗First of siblings‘ and ‗First born is male‘ 
all refer to children of the same father, same mother. Regressions also contain regional 
(department) dummies.  The reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, all other religions, 
occupation ‗inactive‘,  share of cell members 5-15,  no and non-formal schooling. 
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Table 8: Marginal determinants of agricultural employment including inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  All  Rural  Urban  Men  Women  Rural men 
Rural 
women  Urban men 
Urban 
women 
                             
Father in farming  0.0181  0.0219  0.00746  0.0120  0.0188  0.00892  0.0334  0.0158  -0.00185 
  (0.0167)  (0.0326)  (0.0102)  (0.0262)  (0.0166)  (0.0494)  (0.0403)  (0.0197)  (0.00154) 
Mother in farm.  0.0845***  0.145***  0.00958  0.139***  0.0446**  0.240***  0.0779*  -0.0226*  0.0204 
  (0.0242)  (0.0397)  (0.0172)  (0.0376)  (0.0218)  (0.0570)  (0.0432)  (0.0118)  (0.0186) 
Father in non-farm  -0.0355*  -0.0799*  -0.00620  -0.0471  -0.0438**  -0.150**  -0.0516  0.00564  -0.0119 
  (0.0197)  (0.0468)  (0.0103)  (0.0310)  (0.0207)  (0.0687)  (0.0618)  (0.0171)  (0.00737) 
Mother in non-farm  -0.0414*  -0.107*  -0.00494  -0.0656*  -0.0226  -0.161*  -0.0878  -0.0138  -0.000187 
  (0.0224)  (0.0557)  (0.00936)  (0.0356)  (0.0219)  (0.0838)  (0.0625)  (0.0136)  (0.00154) 
Father‘s schooling  0.0371  0.150*  -0.00126  0.0260  0.0282  0.0285  0.211**  0.00739  -0.000617 
  (0.0305)  (0.0855)  (0.0103)  (0.0514)  (0.0313)  (0.131)  (0.107)  (0.0223)  (0.00149) 
Mother‘s schooling  -0.0186  -0.104  -0.000787  -0.0228  -0.0171  -0.127  -0.136*  -0.0194  0.0376 
  (0.0396)  (0.0803)  (0.0163)  (0.0618)  (0.0357)  (0.117)  (0.0725)  (0.0187)  (0.0343) 
Own schooling  -0.0114  -0.0452  -0.00598  -0.0504*  0.0435*  -0.0543  0.0230  -0.0604***  0.00654 
  (0.0187)  (0.0455)  (0.00835)  (0.0282)  (0.0242)  (0.0669)  (0.0620)  (0.0193)  (0.00492) 
Inherited land  0.0623***  0.0916**  0.0117  0.0201  0.0992***  0.00354  0.168***  0.00841  0.0115 
  (0.0230)  (0.0426)  (0.0137)  (0.0304)  (0.0331)  (0.0585)  (0.0653)  (0.0198)  (0.00955) 
Inherited house  0.00736  0.0175  0.0137  -0.0111  0.0209  -0.0305  0.0842  0.0120  -0.000296 
  (0.0188)  (0.0388)  (0.0124)  (0.0265)  (0.0209)  (0.0533)  (0.0548)  (0.0152)  (0.00207) 
Inherited other 
-
0.0432***  -0.0760**  -0.0149**  -0.0331  -0.0289*  -0.0596  -0.0573  -0.0149  -0.00198 
  (0.0159)  (0.0351)  (0.00754)  (0.0250)  (0.0155)  (0.0496)  (0.0435)  (0.0139)  (0.00156) 
                   
Observations  3,190  1,652  1,433  1,422  1,702  731  866  627  554 
Pseudo R
2  0.305  0.213  0.234  0.305  0.365  0.218  0.284  0.298  0.479 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  The 





Table 9: Marginal determinants of non-agricultural employment including inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 







                             
Father in farming  0.0239  0.00973  0.0474  0.0496  0.00176  0.0369  -0.0150  0.0414  0.0710 
  (0.0274)  (0.0295)  (0.0389)  (0.0378)  (0.0347)  (0.0468)  (0.0334)  (0.0422)  (0.0625) 
Mother in farm.  -0.0199  -0.0329  0.0443  -0.0801*  0.0272  -0.114**  0.0125  0.0300  0.0420 
  (0.0318)  (0.0326)  (0.0482)  (0.0445)  (0.0402)  (0.0504)  (0.0377)  (0.0523)  (0.0728) 
Father in non-farm  0.0486*  0.128***  0.00437  0.102**  0.0237  0.202***  0.0994  0.0353  9.27e-06 
  (0.0294)  (0.0460)  (0.0343)  (0.0436)  (0.0388)  (0.0749)  (0.0616)  (0.0395)  (0.0522) 
Mother in non-farm  0.135***  0.130**  0.125***  0.176***  0.113***  0.240***  0.0623  0.105***  0.131*** 
  (0.0313)  (0.0545)  (0.0302)  (0.0476)  (0.0394)  (0.0889)  (0.0623)  (0.0317)  (0.0470) 
Father‘s schooling  -0.0479  -0.0960*  0.0114  -0.00532  -0.0591  0.0161  -0.0980*  0.0329  -0.00552 
  (0.0330)  (0.0540)  (0.0356)  (0.0612)  (0.0393)  (0.124)  (0.0555)  (0.0453)  (0.0510) 
Mother‘s schooling  0.0115  0.173*  -0.0323  0.0843  -0.0237  0.268**  0.135  0.0321  -0.0619 
  (0.0513)  (0.0946)  (0.0559)  (0.0854)  (0.0582)  (0.128)  (0.121)  (0.0692)  (0.0769) 
Own schooling  0.0483*  0.0814*  0.0276  0.161***  -0.0130  0.247***  0.0266  0.117***  -0.0383 
  (0.0269)  (0.0452)  (0.0297)  (0.0380)  (0.0339)  (0.0747)  (0.0508)  (0.0351)  (0.0432) 
Inherited land  -0.0121  0.00565  0.0185  0.0154  -0.00516  0.0735  -0.0372  -0.0216  0.0726 
  (0.0317)  (0.0364)  (0.0444)  (0.0440)  (0.0419)  (0.0582)  (0.0426)  (0.0487)  (0.0632) 
Inherited house  0.0150  -0.0101  0.00849  -0.00725  0.0239  -0.0129  0.00961  -0.0205  0.0250 
  (0.0281)  (0.0352)  (0.0345)  (0.0396)  (0.0351)  (0.0551)  (0.0437)  (0.0383)  (0.0477) 
Inherited other  0.0392  -0.00184  0.104***  0.0189  0.0783**  0.00184  0.0269  0.0631*  0.152*** 
  (0.0279)  (0.0313)  (0.0350)  (0.0372)  (0.0367)  (0.0482)  (0.0390)  (0.0349)  (0.0536) 
                   
Observations  3,169  1,624  1,538  1,409  1,747  705  893  682  849 
Pseudo R
2  0.208  0.142  0.154  0.259  0.179  0.217  0.145  0.149  0.148 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  





Table 10: Marginal determinants of living in the same residence including inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  All  Rural  Urban  Men  Women  Rural men 
Rural 
women  Urban men  
Urban 
women 
                             
Father in farming  -0.0765***  -0.0607*  -0.0367  -0.0884**  -0.0523  -0.0427**  -0.0411  -0.0346  -0.0508 
  (0.0259)  (0.0319)  (0.0533)  (0.0357)  (0.0351)  (0.0208)  (0.0475)  (0.0776)  (0.0695) 
Mother in farm.  -0.0296  -0.0187  -0.0266  0.000695  -0.0466  0.0190  -0.0587  -0.0442  -0.0130 
  (0.0297)  (0.0347)  (0.0700)  (0.0396)  (0.0384)  (0.0190)  (0.0488)  (0.101)  (0.0924) 
Father in non-farm  0.0747**  0.116***  0.0700*  0.0545  0.0761*  0.0547***  0.200***  0.0681  0.0597 
  (0.0299)  (0.0423)  (0.0418)  (0.0380)  (0.0398)  (0.0164)  (0.0710)  (0.0652)  (0.0530) 
Mother in non-farm  0.0987***  0.148***  0.0887**  0.0999**  0.0605  0.0487***  0.149*  0.139*  0.0735 
  (0.0308)  (0.0433)  (0.0417)  (0.0409)  (0.0392)  (0.0179)  (0.0820)  (0.0725)  (0.0514) 
Father‘s schooling  -0.0258  0.0924  -0.0823**  -0.0599  -0.0248  0.0157  0.0634  -0.131**  -0.0511 
  (0.0370)  (0.0662)  (0.0406)  (0.0519)  (0.0461)  (0.0479)  (0.119)  (0.0624)  (0.0505) 
Mother‘s schooling  0.0472  0.138**  -0.0385  0.0462  -0.00292  0.0425*  0.211*  -0.0343  -0.0865 
  (0.0483)  (0.0658)  (0.0566)  (0.0720)  (0.0629)  (0.0226)  (0.123)  (0.122)  (0.0644) 
Own schooling  -0.0482*  -0.0512  -0.0732**  -0.0636*  -0.0222  -0.0783*  0.00202  -0.0916  -0.0908** 
  (0.0277)  (0.0509)  (0.0354)  (0.0378)  (0.0366)  (0.0456)  (0.0692)  (0.0590)  (0.0455) 
Inherited land  -0.0380  0.00648  -0.102**  0.00195  -0.0901**  0.0161  0.0239  -0.0337  -0.142** 
  (0.0290)  (0.0392)  (0.0444)  (0.0389)  (0.0402)  (0.0236)  (0.0631)  (0.0728)  (0.0573) 
Inherited house  0.0310  -0.00573  0.0246  0.0475  0.00455  0.0418*  -0.0932  0.0149  0.0202 
  (0.0251)  (0.0366)  (0.0365)  (0.0326)  (0.0343)  (0.0220)  (0.0584)  (0.0587)  (0.0460) 
Inherited other  0.0167  0.0297  0.00577  0.0221  -0.0217  0.0259  0.0150  0.0143  -0.00543 
  (0.0261)  (0.0340)  (0.0442)  (0.0343)  (0.0357)  (0.0211)  (0.0536)  (0.0695)  (0.0571) 
                   
Observations  3,190  1,652  1,538  1,382  1,761  702  912  663  849 
Pseudo R
2  0.173  0.287  0.330  0.326  0.109  0.360  0.202  0.415  0.314 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  The regressions 
include controls listed in Table 5.37 
 
Table 11: IV estimates for all dependent variables, land inheritance 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Log expend-iture 
per capita 
Non-farm  Farm 
employment 
Same residence as 
parents 
 
All  Heads  Non-heads 
             
Inherited land  0.0417  0.142**  0.101  0.142*  -0.0368  -0.0325 
  (0.145)  (0.0592)  (0.0905)  (0.0778)  (0.0437)  (0.0598) 
Father in farming  0.142***  0.0260  -0.00304  0.0536*  0.0163  -0.0656*** 
  (0.0546)  (0.0218)  (0.0301)  (0.0275)  (0.0195)  (0.0207) 
Mother in farm.  -0.0147  -0.0231  -0.0374  -0.0203  0.117***  -0.0120 
  (0.0581)  (0.0236)  (0.0333)  (0.0308)  (0.0247)  (0.0237) 
Father in non-farm  0.331***  0.0583**  0.0456  0.0782**  -0.0111  0.0514** 
  (0.0586)  (0.0238)  (0.0347)  (0.0315)  (0.0168)  (0.0246) 
Mother in non-farm  -0.0865  0.109***  0.165***  0.0982***  -0.0182  0.0960*** 
  (0.0599)  (0.0249)  (0.0399)  (0.0313)  (0.0154)  (0.0255) 
Father‘s schooling  0.173**  -0.0182  0.0217  -0.0476  0.0179  -0.00635 
  (0.0683)  (0.0260)  (0.0391)  (0.0364)  (0.0158)  (0.0299) 
Mother‘s schooling  0.275***  -0.0138  -0.00311  -0.0103  0.0151  0.0447 
  (0.0858)  (0.0380)  (0.0603)  (0.0485)  (0.0253)  (0.0366) 
Constant  12.07***  0.0324  0.350  0.000805  0.541***  0.598*** 
  (0.361)  (0.108)  (0.224)  (0.135)  (0.117)  (0.180) 
Observations  3,499  3,524  1,519  2,005  3,524  3,524 
R
2  0.494  0.234  0.278  0.270  0.272  0.214 
Linear IV coefficients for (2)-(6). Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions exclude own education, whether 
fostered and age at first marriage; other  controls are as in Table 5.  38 
 
Table 12: Inequality decomposition implied by Table 6  
 
  Share of inequality attributable to each source (%): 
  All  Rural  Urban  Men  Women 
            
Male  0.17  0.00  1.56  --  -- 
Age  0.82  0.90  1.82  -1.50  -5.67 
Age squared  -1.45  -1.09  -1.74  4.14  5.54 
Muslim  -0.06  -0.21  0.32  -0.09  -0.08 
Serere  1.39  9.16  -0.06  1.97  0.97 
Poular  0.54  0.50  0.16  1.91  0.05 
Diola  -0.06  1.41  -0.03  -0.04  -0.15 
Mandingue  0.11  -0.04  0.41  0.13  0.06 
Sarakole  0.00  0.18  0.02  -0.05  0.02 
Mandiaque  -0.07  0.32  0.05  -0.04  -0.01 
Other ethnicity  0.02  0.07  -0.01  0.31  0.03 
Brothers same father  0.06  -0.05  0.27  0.16  0.00 
Brothers same parents  0.14  0.35  0.06  0.66  0.01 
Sisters same father  -0.04  -0.08  0.03  0.04  0.03 
Sisters same parents  0.36  0.69  0.26  0.24  0.70 
Brothers same mother  0.13  0.02  0.43  0.07  0.24 
Sisters same mother  0.03  -0.02  0.00  -0.07  0.09 
First same gender  0.00  -0.18  -0.08  -0.07  -0.01 
First of siblings  -0.04  0.51  0.53  0.00  0.06 
First born is male  0.21  1.00  0.13  0.05  -0.09 
Father dead recently  0.02  0.03  0.10  0.00  0.01 
Father in farming  -1.82  -0.21  -1.03  -1.70  -1.46 
Mother in farming  0.16  -0.40  0.67  1.82  -1.21 
Father in non-farm  5.75  3.22  4.21  7.46  4.80 
Mother in non-farm  -0.40  0.79  0.38  -0.51  -0.40 
Father‘s schooling  0.34  -0.25  1.20  0.87  0.02 
Mother‘s schooling  1.07  0.38  2.43  0.44  1.85 
Father rural  -2.53  -0.22  -0.27  -3.42  -2.10 
Mother rural  3.46  0.30  0.87  2.71  4.33 
Log hh size  3.00  1.11  8.46  3.07  2.80 
Log cell size  6.39  27.57  7.62  4.85  3.44 
Share of cell aged<5  3.62  7.14  4.21  2.93  3.20 
Share of cell adults  10.63  11.15  18.11  5.69  9.02 
Has formal schooling  9.21  3.75  10.15  7.04  10.88 
Fostered  0.91  0.72  1.14  1.41  0.22 
Fostered young  -0.06  0.00  -0.08  -0.42  0.55 
Age at first marriage  0.99  4.28  -0.42  -0.47  2.64 
Inherited land  0.25  0.31  0.28  0.90  -0.03 
Inherited house  0.07  -0.76  0.41  -0.01  0.10 
Other inheritance  0.08  1.44  0.36  -0.49  0.01 
Rural  23.80  --  na  23.46  27.57 
           
Total share explained  50.40    30.10    39.40    47.90    52.90   
 Note: All sources do not add to the total share explained due to the omission of the share of inequality due to 
department of residence.     39 
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Log cell consumption per capita  4326  11.326  1.466  5.336  18.059 
In farming   4377  0.222  0.416  0  1 
In non-farm  4377  0.413  0.492  0  1 
Same residence as parents  4377  0.555  0.497  0  1 
Male  4377  0.437  0.496  0  1 
Age  4370  42.314  15.063  13  96 
Muslim  4377  0.954  0.210  0  1 
Serere ethnicity  4364  0.128  0.334  0  1 
Poular ethnicity  4364  0.308  0.462  0  1 
Diola ethnicity  4364  0.040  0.197  0  1 
Mandingue ethnicity  4364  0.062  0.241  0  1 
Sarakole ethnicity  4364  0.023  0.149  0  1 
Mandiaque ethnicity  4364  0.011  0.104  0  1 
Other ethnicity  4364  0.040  0.196  0  1 
Brothers same father (no.)  4322  1.668  2.316  0  21 
Brothers same parents (no.)  4329  1.986  1.633  0  11 
Sisters same father (no.)  4317  1.502  2.216  0  17 
Sisters same parents (no.)  4330  1.952  1.671  0  14 
Brothers same mother (no.)  4321  0.318  0.892  0  10 
Sisters same mother (no.)  4321  0.277  0.826  0  10 
First born same gender  4377  0.465  0.499  0  1 
First born of siblings  4377  0.291  0.454  0  1 
First born is male  4280  0.569  0.495  0  1 
Father dead recently  4377  0.068  0.252  0  1 
Father in farming  4377  0.051  0.220  0  1 
Mother in farming  4377  0.374  0.484  0  1 
Father in non-farm  4377  0.221  0.415  0  1 
Mother in non-farm  4377  0.282  0.450  0  1 
Father‘s schooling  4377  0.136  0.343  0  1 
Mother‘s schooling  4377  0.102  0.302  0  1 
Father rural  3877  0.051  0.220  0  1 
Mother rural  3948  0.660  0.474  0  1 
Log hh size  4377  0.651  0.477  0  1 
Log cell size  4377  2.142  0.689  0  3.784 
Share of cell members aged<5  4377  0.970  0.699  0  2.708 
Share of adults in cell  4377  0.146  0.213  0  0.8 
Has formal education  4377  0.645  0.318  0  1 
Fostered  4377  0.262  0.440  0  1 
Fostered young  4377  0.152  0.359  0  1 
Age at first marriage  3838  0.073  0.261  0  1 
Inherited land  4377  22.394  6.773  10  56 
Inherited house  4377  0.246  0.431  0  1 
Other inheritance  4377  0.334  0.472  0  1 
Rural  4377  0.073  0.261  0  1 
Father dead  4274  0.574  0.494  0  1 
Mother dead  4266  0.657  0.475  0  1 
Notes: The statistics are population weighted. The variables ‗First born same gender‘, ‗First born of 
siblings‘ and ‗First born is male‘ all refer to children of the same father, same mother. 43 
 
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive statistics by gender 
   
         Women 
   
 
   
Men 
     
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.  Min  Max    Obs  Mean  Std.  Min  Max  t-test of 
equality 
 
         
 
           
Log cell consumption p.c.  2442  11.093  1.370  6.812  17.589    1884  11.625  1.529  5.336  18.059  -14.47 
In farming  2471  0.170  0.376  0  1    1906  0.289  0.453  0  1  -8.10 
In non farm   2471  0.331  0.471  0  1    1906  0.519  0.500  0  1  -14.16 
Same residence   2471  0.465  0.499  0  1    1906  0.671  0.470  0  1  -11.66 
Age  2471  39.224  14.124  13  96    1902  46.291  15.302  15  95  -18.73 
Muslim  2471  0.951  0.215  0  1    1906  0.957  0.203  0  1  -.88 
Serere ethnicity  2466  0.129  0.335  0  1    1898  0.126  0.332  0  1  0.40 
Poular ethnicity  2466  0.295  0.456  0  1    1898  0.325  0.468  0  1  -2.16 
Diola ethnicity  2466  0.045  0.207  0  1    1898  0.034  0.182  0  1  2.13 
Mandingue ethnicity  2466  0.069  0.253  0  1    1898  0.053  0.225  0  1  2.64 
Sarakole ethnicity  2466  0.023  0.150  0  1    1898  0.023  0.149  0  1  -0.02 
Mandiaque ethnicity  2466  0.013  0.112  0  1    1898  0.009  0.092  0  1  1.73 
Other ethnicity  2466  0.039  0.193  0  1    1898  0.042  0.200  0  1  -0.81 
Brothers same father  2440  1.628  2.226  0  21    1882  1.719  2.428  0  20  -1.51 
Brothers same parents   2444  2.045  1.645  0  10    1885  1.911  1.614  0  11  1.90 
Sisters same father  2435  1.505  2.198  0  17    1882  1.498  2.239  0  15  -0.12 
Sisters same parents  2445  2.038  1.676  0  12    1885  1.842  1.658  0  14  4.00 
Brothers same mother  2440  0.326  0.891  0  10    1881  0.308  0.894  0  9  1.14 
Sisters same mother  2440  0.282  0.843  0  10    1881  0.270  0.804  0  10  1.05 
First same gender  2471  0.448  0.497  0  1    1906  0.488  0.500  0  1  -2.34 
First of siblings  2471  0.261  0.439  0  1    1906  0.329  0.470  0  1  -4.80 
First born is male  2411  0.433  0.496  0  1    1869  0.743  0.437  0  1  -20.34 
Father died recently  2471  0.074  0.262  0  1    1906  0.061  0.240  0  1  1.52 
Mother died recently    0.054  0.227  0  1   
  0.047  0.211  0  1  1.42 
Father in farming  2471  0.384  0.486  0  1    1900  0.360  0.480  0  1  1.64 
Mother in farm.  2471  0.238  0.426  0  1    1900  0.200  0.400  0  1  3.33 
Father in non-farm  2471  0.299  0.458  0  1    1900  0.261  0.439  0  1  2.92 44 
 
Mother in non-farm  2471  0.146  0.354  0  1    1900  0.122  0.328  0  1  2.74 
Father‘s schooling  2471  0.116  0.320  0  1    1900  0.083  0.276  0  1  3.35 
Mother‘s schooling  2471  0.057  0.233  0  1    1900  0.043  0.202  0  1  2.17 
Father rural  2191  0.644  0.479  0  1    1683  0.681  0.466  0  1  -1.98 
Mother rural  2236  0.632  0.482  0  1    1709  0.676  0.468  0  1  -2.43 
Log hh size  2471  2.179  0.630  0  3.784    1906  2.094  0.756  0  3.784  5.21 
Log cell size  2471  1.223  0.601  0  2.708    1906  0.645  0.681  0  2.708  28.01 
Share of cell aged<5  2471  0.209  0.233  0  0.8    1906  0.065  0.149  0  0.75  22.71 
Share of adults in cell   2471  0.502  0.287  0  1    1906  0.829  0.254  0.143  1  -36.00 
Has formal education  2471  0.229  0.420  0  1    1900  0.305  0.461  0  1  -7.08 
Fostered   2471  0.143  0.350  0  1    1900  0.164  0.371  0  1  -1.68 
Fostered young  2471  0.088  0.284  0  1    1900  0.054  0.226  0  1  4.29 
Age at first marriage  2138  18.684  4.788  10  51    1699  26.997  6.007  12  56  -48.66 
Inherited land  2471  0.176  0.381  0  1    1906  0.336  0.472  0  1  -11.29 
Inherited house  2471  0.278  0.448  0  1    1906  0.407  0.491  0  1  -8.45 
Inherited other  2471  0.049  0.215  0  1    1906  0.105  0.307  0  1  -6.76 
Rural  2471  0.576  0.494  0  1    1906  0.573  0.495  0  1  1.36 
Father is dead  2412  0.600  0.490  0  1    1862  0.730  0.444  0  1  -8.67 
Mother is dead  2414  0.359  0.480  0  1    1852  0.462  0.499  0  1  -6.83 
           
 
            Notes : The statistics are population weighted. The variables ‗First born same gender‘, ‗First born of siblings‘ and ‗First born is male‘ all refer to children of the 
same father, same mother. 
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Appendix 2: Regression-based decomposition of inequality 
A measure of (relative) inequality can be written in the generic form: 
) / ,..., / ( 1   N y y I I   
where yi is the i‘th person‘s consumption in a population of size N and μ is mean income.  We 
assume that this measure is continuous, symmetric (swapping incomes does not change the 
measure), normalized such that inequality is zero when all persons have the same income, and 
that the measure satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom‖ such that a transfer from rich to poor 
reduces inequality.  For some sorts of distributional comparisons we may not need to know any 
more about the measure of inequality.
22   
In our empirical work we will focus on two special cases of the above class of measures. 
The first is the well-known Gini index (G), given by the (household-size weighted) mean 
absolute deviation between all pairs of per capita household incomes.  The second is a member 
of the Generalized Entropy class of additively decomposable measures, namely the average log 













We will ask how much of the level of inequality or its change over time is due to some variable 










where xik is the k‘th predictors (xim can be taken to be an error term, with βm=1).  Following 
Fields (1996) and Ravallion and Chen (1999), the contribution of the k‘th explanatory variable to 











This is simply the product of the partial regression coefficient of income on schooling (holding 
all other variables constant) with that total regression coefficient of schooling on income 
(holding nothing else constant).   The contributions of each asset to the changes over time can 
then be determined.  The precise decomposition will naturally depend on the regression 
specification. 
                                                           
22   For example, if the Lorenz curve (giving, on the vertical axis, the share of total income held by the poorest 
x% of the population) for distribution A is everywhere above that of B then all inequality measures in the above 
class of measures will show higher inequality in B than A (Atkinson, 1970).   